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1. Introduction 
 
“The world of contracting has changed over time.” “Mass marketing is a modern way of 
making offers to consumers, and marketing information is often decisive when a purchase 
decision is made.” “It is therefore right that marketers have a more extensive responsibility 
for their advertising than previously.”1 
In the 1960’s and 70’s, consumer protection emerged as a cross-cutting policy in Western 
Europe.2 The modern market economy was seen to exacerbate the imbalance between 
consumers and businesses, and one factor behind this was the increasing and intensifying 
pressure of marketing. As markets became more competitive, competition with quality and 
price was not enough. Instead businesses had to direct ever greater resources to marketing.3 
The traditional distinction between buyer and seller was also blurred in marketing, as it was 
also in the interest of producers, wholesalers and branch organizations to promote products.4  
Most contracting of today is anonymous and standardized.5 The century-old Nordic Contract 
Acts does not adequately regulate this type of contract formation, where marketing 
information is an essential element in the decision to purchase.  
The Finnish insurance contract act (543/1994) section 9.1 (referred to as “the rule” 
henceforth) is a stark example of an extensive responsibility for marketing with a direct 
benefit for consumers and small businesses that are in a comparably weak negotiating 
position towards the insurer. The rule mandates that if the insurer or its representative has 
failed to provide the necessary information or has given incorrect or misleading information 
to the policyholder when marketing the insurance, the insurance contract is considered to be 
in force to the effect understood by the policyholder on the basis of the information received.6  
The rule was crafted in the mid 1980’s during the protracted, pan-Nordic reforms of the 
insurance contract acts. Similar rules have been authoritatively been proposed for Finnish 
contract law, in 1990, and for the Nordic consumer protection laws, in 2001. The insurance 
rule is still exceptional in a Nordic and EU context, as insurance law and contract law in 
                                                          
1 KKV 2008. Finnish consumer ombudsman’s guidelines for marketing.  All translations from Finnish or 
Swedish to English are my own. 
2 Yritysoikeus 2014 p.1001 
3 Yritysoikeus 2014 p.1002 
4 André 1984 p.586 
5 André 1984 p.586 
6 (Emphasis added) 
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general maintain a sharper distinction between the contract and any preceding marketing 
information.7 The rule is also unique in Finnish contract law.8  
In this thesis I aim to analyze the theoretical implications of the marketing liability rule for 
contract law. The analysis is applied to the situation where marketing information or sales 
information gives a wrong impression about the subsequent detailed contract terms. The 
study addresses two overarching questions: 1) How can indefinite promises become the 
content of a contract, 2) what can be learned from the historical attempts to legislate this 
question?  To clarify, by indefinite promise I mean a statement that is unequivocal (the 
meaning is clear) but which, like an untargeted advertisement, does not qualify by itself as a 
binding offer. This kind of (non-)promise can also be by made by leaving out information, 
or made by a third party that has no authority to give a binding offer. 
 
1.1 Structure  
 
In this first chapter I present the method and sources. The second chapter presents the 
problem of indefinite marketing promises, and recaps the Nordic legislative attempts to craft 
new contractual rules to solve the issue. The aim is to reflect why these attempts failed, with 
insurance law being the notable exception. 
The 3rd chapter of this thesis reflects on the implications of the insurance rule on contract 
law theory. The chapter looks at the wider interaction between law, norms and economic 
behavior. Secondly, the chapter examines the implications of the insurance law on 
contracting and legislative techniques. 
The 4th chapter examines the legislative history of the rule. The aim of the chapter is to show 
how the points of tension between insurance contract law and general contract law 
influenced the outcome of the process.     
The 5th chapter presents the conclusions of the study. 
 
                                                          
7 In German insurance law, insufficient marketing information can lead to the insurance being in force as 
the policyholder has understood it, but this consequence is not codified in the German ICA.  Luukkonen & 
Mäntyniemi 1996 p.107.  
8 Koponen 2008 p.84 
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1.2 Method and sources   
 
That there is interaction and dialogue between industry-specific and general contract law is 
widely recognized but studying this interaction is methodologically challenging.9  Insurance 
contract law has been studied by Juha Häyhä as part of general contract law and as an 
instrument to assess changes in general contract law.10 Contract law can also be approached 
from the specific point of view of a particular profession or type of interaction.  
In his research on liability for misleading information, Jan-Ove Færstad claims that if a 
researcher chooses both the general and specific approaches, the inherent difficulty of this 
method means that he or she in reality also chooses to delimit both approaches from the 
research, as it would not be feasible to focus on both aspects in a balanced way.11  However, 
in his research on precontractual information duties, Thomas Wilhelmsson employs a dual 
approach. He notes that in the acquis communautaire of the EU, the general obligations and 
specific information duties have different functions, and both are needed for principled 
reasoning.12   
Contract law research, traditionally, interprets the content of state law. Stephen Smith claims 
that other social norms, that explain the behavior of contracting parties, need to be 
recognized by the legal authorities, either explicitly or implicitly, to qualify as part of 
contract law.13 Likewise, Marko Mononen claims that contract law research is intrinsic to 
the legal system, and thus it has a purpose, to create stability. Mononen warns that legal 
research should not attempt to assess or change contract law on purely moral grounds.14  In 
practice, as the modes of contracting are changing at an increasingly fast pace, the static 
nature of legal research means that while economic theories can adapt to model these 
changes, legal theories do not evolve at the same pace.15  
Contract law theories answer two types of fundamental questions. These are the analytic 
question of how the law functions and the normative question that examines the justification 
                                                          
9 Häyhä 1996 p.26 
10 Häyhä 1996 p.26  
11 Færstad 2014 p.33 ref. 87 According to Færstad a research with a dual approach could contribute 
to jurisprudence, but such research still necessarily focuses on either the specific or the general. 
12 Wilhelmsson 2006 p.20 
13 Smith 2007 p.8-11 
14 Mononen 2001 p.458 
15 Timonen 1997 p.39 
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for contract law.16 Neither of these questions can be fully understood without a wider social 
context. A legal rule does not in itself reveal when it serves a valid formal purpose in the 
interest of legal certainty, or when it is unnecessarily and stubbornly formalistic, even though 
society has changed.17  
Pöyhönen has asked if the fundamental aim of contract law theory is always to justify forms 
of power of the state, or if the aim has become to facilitate emancipation.18 His question 
highlights the methodological gap between the law and its societal functions. One way to 
bridge this gap is through a pronounced self-awareness of the power, actions, logic and 
preconditions of law.19  
A researcher needs to be aware of the legal professions need for practical and applicable 
knowledge, and should explain exceptional complexity and discontinuance with established 
dogmatic views.20 When the aim of a research is only to examine which norms are binding, 
it is enough to say that they are binding, instead of reflecting on who or how they are seen 
as binding.21 The main reason for the more abstract approach, or meta-level, in this research 
is the practical methodological problem that the insurance rule, that is de lege lata (the law 
as it is), is very similar to contract law and consumer protection rules that were never enacted. 
These latter rules are thus potential rules or de lege ferenda (the law as it should be). 
To determine whether the potential rules should be enacted, the insurance rule has significant 
implications that can be deduced through conceptual analysis. This study draws in particular 
from the philosophical works of John Searle, François Ewald, and Mikko Wennberg.  
The liability for marketing in Finnish insurance law has been examined by authors such as 
Häyhä, Esko Hoppu, Kari Hoppu, Mika Hemmo and Jaana Norio-Timonen as a part of more 
general overviews of Finnish insurance contract law or the marketing of investment 
products.22 These authors have drawn from domestic case law, especially the non-binding 
decisions of the Finnish Insurance Complaints Board (VKL), as relatively few insurance 
                                                          
16 Smith 2004 p.43–49 
17 cf. Atiyah 1986 p.95 
18 Pöyhönen 1986 p. 378 
19 Koulu 2014 p.71, ref. 154;  
20 As research needs to be controlled and understood by the academic community. Siltala 2002 
p.483, 488 
21 Koulu 2014 p.71, ref. 154;  
22 see bibliographic references 
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cases are adjudicated in courts.23 Consequently, this study refers to legal praxis mostly as 
indicated by other authors. 
The examination of the historicity of the insurance rule looks at how the legal community at 
the time of legislation conceptualized the rule. The legal historical method can be used to 
assess legal change or continuity.24 Historical examination can also reveal if the legislative 
decisions were strictly rational, fulfilling predefined interests, or if interests evolved during 
the process, influenced by cultural factors, social interaction and the persuasive capabilities 
of the participants.25 Specifically, I examine the legislative process that resulted in the 
insurance law rule. My source materials are the meeting protocols, speeches and personal 
letters of the Nordic insurance law committees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 The section 9.1 has been analyzed in at least two Master’s thesis at the University of Helsinki, by 
Anne Piiroinen in 2004 and by Tommi Koponen in 2008.  
24 Kekkonen 1987 p.2 
25 Hyvärinen 2012 p.7 
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2. Indefinite marketing promises and the content of contracts  
 
In Finnish law, marketing as a legal term covers commercial communication extensively, 
such as advertisements and information given in conjunction with sales or otherwise, with 
the aim of promoting sales or the image of the business.26 The legal question of indefinite 
marketing promises and the content of contracts can be distinguished by looking at the other 
legal responses that have developed due to the increasing pressure of marketing.  
Mathias André has noted that the common feature of all of these responses is that they aim 
to promote the value of information in marketing.27 In the Nordic states, this response has 
predominantly been through special acts on marketing and fair trading, and not as a question 
of contract law.28 The Nordic states have since the 1970’s enacted regimes of trade regulation 
on what is acceptable marketing, imposed mandatory information duties in the sale of 
different products and services, and negotiated sector specific standard terms.29   
Trade regulation is a form of collective consumer protection and thus benefits individual 
consumers only indirectly.30  Specific disputes between a consumer and an entrepreneur are 
dealt through private law.31 Trade regulation operates mostly on a macro-economic level, 
whereas individuals need protection on the micro-economic level.32  
 
2.1 The private law responses to indefinite promises and the trailer-principle 
 
That a marketing liability exists is, to some extent, a general principle of Nordic contract 
law33. Peter Møgelvang-Hansen has noted that the “precontractual, binding statement rule” 
extends beyond positive statutory rules.34 The principle is not very precise, as marketing can 
                                                          
26 HE 32/2008 vp p.19; The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) uses the term ‘commercial 
communication’ including advertising and marketing, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply 
of a product to consumers. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market;    
27 André 1984 p.592 
28 Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.170 
29 André 1984 p.587, KKV 2006, KKV 2014 
30 Yritysoikeus 2014 p.1005 
31  Yritysoikeus 2014 p.1005 
32 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.179 
33 Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.170, André 1984 passim, 
34 Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.171 
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include many types of statements that are not clearly distinguishable from other statements 
in contracting. A rough distinction can be made between the legal recourse that is available 
when 1) sufficiently definite marketing qualifies as a binding promise or offer35, 2) 
marketing information is grounds for general private law remedies 3) the information given 
can be regarded as being the seller’s and 4) indefinite marketing promises become part of 
the contract.  
The first recourse is distinguished by the traditional presupposition that marketing 
information does not constitute an offer, but an invitation to offer,36 and for information in 
marketing to have binding effects, as an offer, it needs to be precise and confined to a certain 
target group.37 This question of contract formation strongly influences the interpretation of 
the content of contracts.38 In Nordic Contract Law, any statement meant to be binding is a 
unilaterally binding statement, which means that statements become irrevocable sooner than 
in other legal systems.39 Standard terms are part of the offer, only if they are incorporated 
into the contract. Older legal praxis has shown that the when the insurer has not explicitly 
referred to these terms, the courts have increasingly denied binding effect, in order to 
influence the content of the contract in favor of the policyholder.40  
According to the will theory the intentions of the parties, rather than the actions, are 
paramount in determining the contractual obligations. The reliance theory instead focused 
on the how the offer itself could be objectively understood, as a way of compensating for 
trusting the other party. In consumer sales, this objective understanding is seen in how 
certain marketing information is almost automatically classified as a binding offer, such as 
price tags in shops, as well as specified information, usually prices, in personally addressed 
marketing (post, email, sms),  as well in online marketing (cf. section 5:23 of the Finnish 
Consumer Protection Act 1978/38). Also information about giveaways or bonuses are 
binding offers.41 
                                                          
35 Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.170;  
36 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.102    
37 KOM 1990:20 p. 98 
38 KOM 1990:20 p.5 
39 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.182–183 
40 Wilhelmsson 1977 p.395-397 
41 KKV 2008  
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However, conceptualizing marketing information as an offer is only one starting point in 
determining the content of contracts, as marketing also contains information that cannot be 
constructed as a binding offer, but that still prompts legal responses.  
The second recourse is distinguished by a presupposition that Nordic contract law is flexible 
and, especially after the introduction of the general clause 36 in the Nordic Contract Acts, 
can respond effectively to marketing pressure. The ensuing contract can be deemed unfair 
in light of the circumstances that preceded the contract. These circumstances including 
marketing information. This information can thus constitute grounds to annul, set aside or 
adjust unfair contract terms.42 Surprising or onerous standard terms may be also be set aside, 
if these had not been emphasized to the weaker party that had not drafted them. Also, 
marketing information may constitute grounds for damages during contract negotiations, 
when a contract is after all not concluded or other loss is incurred.43 These remedies however 
are not specific to marketing information, and the threshold for applicability of the general 
clause for example in insurance contracts has been relatively high. (NJA 1992 s. 782, KKO 
1983 II 49). Wilhelmsson has noted that courts also exercise a hidden control of onerous 
terms through for example a restrictive interpretation of the unclear wording of the contract 
contra stipulatorem (against the drafter), thus avoiding having to make judgments on the 
fairness of the contract terms.44 
The last two available recourses, when indefinite marketing promises become the content of 
the contract, or when such promises can be regarded as being the seller’s, are based on the 
presupposition that marketing creates legally protected expectations.45 In Nordic contract 
law, this protection can be approached through the concepts of non-conformity, 
identification and commercial effect. These concepts are found in the section 18 of the 
Nordic Sale of Goods Acts (SGA), according to which goods are defective, if they do not 
conform to concrete information that can be presumed to have had an effect on the contract, 
given in marketing, by the seller or a person other than the seller, either at a previous level 
of the chain of supply or on behalf of the seller, about the properties or use of the goods.  
                                                          
42 André 1984, p. 441 
43 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.62 
44 Wilhelmsson 1977 p.370-371 
45 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.180 
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The SGA has in Finnish jurisprudence been seen to reflect general principles of contract law, 
and thus have implications beyond its scope,46 especially in complementing the near 
identical provision of section 2:13.1 of the Finnish Consumer Protection Act (CPA).  The 
CPA rule was initially also limited to goods, but the scope has been expanded also to include 
certain consumer services (8:13 § Work related to movables and buildings, and 9:14.1 § 
Construction contracts). The primary remedy for defect in both the SGA and CPA is 
rectification or delivery of non-defective goods. If this is not possible, the purchase price 
may be reduced, or ultimately the contract can be cancelled. The Consumer Sales Directive 
(CSD) reinforces these principles of the SGA, as according to article 2(2) of the CSD goods 
are defective if they do not conform to the consumer's reasonable expectations created by 
advertising. 47  
In his seminal systematization from 1984, Mathias André examined only the prerequisites 
for liability for marketing information, but not the sanction systems, for example whether 
marketing information allowed for avoidance of a contract or a reduction in price. Instead, 
he contended that “these questions are certainly important for the marketer as well as the 
recipient of marketing, but the content of the liability is not dependent on whether the 
liability was triggered by marketing, or something else, for example the naturalia negotii48 
of the contract”, and that the liability was the same regardless of medium by which the 
information was transmitted.49 André also limited his examination to information that was 
voluntarily disclosed, and did not examine rules that prescribe a precontractual duty to 
disclose. He noted that the duty to disclose was a particular and extensive question, and 
strongly dependent on the needs of the recipient for that information.50  
Marketing liability also functions as a sanction for neglecting pre-contractual information 
duties.51 According to section 5.1 of the ICA, the insurer must provide the applicant with 
necessary information before the contract is concluded, so that the applicant can determine 
his or her need for insurance and choose a suitable insurance. The insurer must also point 
out to the applicant any material restrictions to the coverage. This section mandates a 
minimum level of disclosure, against which the insurer can be held liable for not providing 
                                                          
46 Hoppu 2004 p. 305-306 
47 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.172 
48 In roman law the rights naturally flowing from any contract of sale 
49 André 1984, p .26, 281, 411 
50 André 1984 p.24 
51 Møgelvang-Hansen 2007 p.170 
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necessary information.52 However, the insurer can be held liable for all information that is 
given voluntarily, if this information is incorrect or misleading and gives the applicant a 
mistaken impression of the insurance contract. 
According to Thomas Wilhelmsson, disclosure duties have varied functions and purposes.53 
He notes that these are achieved through general obligations of honesty and specific, 
formalized information duties towards weaker parties.54 The problem with extensive 
information duties, is that consumers are inundated with information that they usually do not 
read. Thus, liability for marketing information should be seen through this function: it can 
limit the need for mandatory information, make it more accessible and give the client a right 
impression of the product. 
In Finnish contract law, the principle of marketing liability (‘markkinointivastuu’), refers in 
particular to the rules of the SGA, CPA and the ICA.55 In the other Nordic states, this term 
(‘marknadsföringsansvar’), introduced by André in 1984, is not as widely used.56 Kai Krüger 
and Møgelvang-Hansen have in their report “Reklamens bindende virkning: om 
kontraktsrettslige og markedsrettslige rettsvirkninger av reklame etter nordisk rett” 
systematized the binding effects of advertising in Nordic law in 2001. This report was 
commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers and subsequently endorsed by the Nordic 
consumer ombudsmen.57 The reason that the report is not entitled with the term “marketing” 
was that the authors made the distinction that marketing, when understood beyond 
advertising, included commercial communications in relation to contracting, whereas 
advertisements influence the recipients’ initial decision to purchase goods. 58 
Krüger and Møgelvang-Hansen have identified in Nordic contract law a “trailer-principle” 
which in my opinion aptly reflects the wider implications of the Finnish insurance rule. The 
principle covers the legal praxis of assessing marketing information as a short-version (like 
a movie trailer) of an extensive offer that in turn has caveats and restrictions. This principle 
is quite weak, as the starting point for legal assessment is that it is generally accepted that 
                                                          
52 Hoppu 2004 p.316 
53 For Wilhelmsson the main purposes of information duties are the protection of real consent, facilitating 
rational market behavior, upholding informational clarity, controlling fairness and upholding a moral duty of 
honesty. He writes:  ”Personally I think this moral component of law and its society-building function have 
been seriously underestimated when discussing duties to inform.”  Wilhelmsson 2005 p.8.  
54 Wilhelmsson 2005 p.17 
55 Norio-Timonen 2007 p.30, Hoppu 2004 p.301-359 
56 one Swedish example is Svenssons & Stenlund & Brink & Ström 1996 p.465 
57 KKV 2008 
58 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.54  
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marketing does not preclude onerous contract terms. For example, the terms for a banking 
service might be so complex that these cannot be expressed meaningfully in an 
advertisement.59  
However, the trailer-principle shows that there is a legal limit to how much marketing can 
distort expectations, and this limit can be derived from the good business practice. Krüger 
and Møgelvang-Hansen present the examples that in the travel agency business, it is not 
good practice to advertise discount last minute trips without caveats, if there are less than 10 
seats available, and the Swedish National Board for Consumer Disputes has awarded in such 
a case the difference between the ordinary and discounted price. Likewise, the Norwegian 
Consumer Complaints Board has awarded the difference between a discounted ferry ticket 
and an ordinary ferry ticket, when the advertisement did not contained limitations on the 
height of a vehicle. The trailer-principle is of course most relevant to insurance, and for 
example according to a Norwegian precedent (Rt. 1997.1807) the insurer bore the risk, as it 
marketed and sold standardized insurance products, that information about the restrictions 
to the cover reached the insured.60  
The question of an appropriate sanction, when the trailer-principle is violated, is an open 
legal question in Nordic law. Krüger and Møgelvang-Hansen noted that to always base 
sanctions solely on the circumstances of the case, “creates an impression of a disorderly 
coupling of the administrative trade regulation and private law elements in the chain of 
events”. To solve the problem de lege ferenda the authors called for a choice between the 
alternatives of administrative sanction, negative interest61 or a treating the marketing 
information as a binding offer.62 A choice of an appropriate sanction, according to Krüger 
and Møgelvang-Hansen, needs to consider that: 
“Det veiledende synspunkt matte trolig være at ‘ekte’ tilbudsvirkning må forutsette at 
utsagnet språklig og kontekstuelt vanskelig kan forenes med den snevre tolkning som 
utsagnsgiveren senere vill legge til grunn når han vil anføre at tilbudet har 
begrensninger. Igjen kan rettspedagogiske, reelle hensyn tilsi at man i større grad 
innstiller seg på å sanksjonere denne slags prokontraktuelle culpa (in contrahendo) 
med de for selgeren mer ubekvemme bundenhetssanksjoner enn de tradisjonelle basert 
på markedsrettslige inngrep og (mer unntaksvis) erstatning for negativ 
kontraktsintresse.”   
 
                                                          
59 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.138 
60 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.136, 139 
61 ”en tentativ grunn for erstatningsansvar utmålt som negativ kontraktsintresse”  
62 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.138 
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The trailer-principle shows that contrary to what André claims63, marketing liability should 
be examined together with the system of sanctions. In the Finnish ICA the sanction is 
triggered by marketing information, and not the “natural” characteristics of an insurance 
contract.  
 
2.2 Attempts to codify a contractual rule 
 
In addition to the legal responses outlined above, there have been several attempts to codify 
these “sanctions of binding effect” into Nordic Contract Law. Already in 1984, André 
proposed adding a new rule to the Nordic Sale of Goods acts:  
”Har säljaren lämnat uppgift om priset, varans egenskaper eller avtalsprestationer i 
övrigt och har uppgiften ingått i köparens beslutsunderlag utgör den avtalsinnehåll.”.64 
This contractual rule should have been complemented, according to André, with a flexible 
rule on tort liability, for situations beyond contract negotiations, where marketing 
information caused any type of direct damage. As an example of easily quantifiable damage 
under such a rule, André pointed out the effects of the insurer’s information about the extent 
of coverage on the policyholder’s behavior.65   
Working between 1987 and 1990, a Finnish legislative committee unsuccessfully proposed 
reforms of the Contracts Act (228/1929), as well as a new law on standard form contracts.66 
Norway also appointed a similar reform committee in 1990, but it never finished its work.67  
The Finnish committee noted that a legal reform where promises given in marketing were 
treated as binding offers would not be enough, as marketing could cause even other kinds of 
loss for which the marketer should bear responsibility, for example in situations when there 
are only a few of the advertised items in stock.68 The proposed new section on the effect of 
indefinite promises was as follows: 
“1c § If a party to a contract has in connection with its marketing given information about 
a price, characteristics of a product or other information on the performance of the 
                                                          
63 André 1984 p.26 
64 André 574 
65 André 1996 p.584 
66 Kom 1990:20  
67 Woxholt, Geir 2006 p.462 
68 Kom 1990:20 p.118; 144–148 
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contract, and this information can be assumed to have had influenced when the contract 
was entered into, shall such information be deemed part of the contract.”69 
This liability would have extended to information given by someone acting on behalf of the 
contracting party, unless the contracting party could have shown that it did not and should 
not have known about this information.70  
The Finnish proposal was jointly reviewed by experts from the Nordic consumer protection 
agencies at a seminar entitled “Konsumentkrav på ny avtalslag”71. Although some experts 
pondered whether contract law theory itself should be revised, others countered that it was 
not feasible to think of consumer protections free from existing contract law, and that such 
an unbound legislative approach would not produce relevant knowledge, especially as the 
European Community initiatives were already making it difficult to even maintain the 
present level of “consumer friendly contract law”.72 However, the agencies nevertheless 
agreed that these proposals reflected common Nordic law, and they would create a desirable 
preventive effect on the individual, micro-level against reprehensible marketing behavior. 
Also, “fresh and clear” legislation would have intrinsic informative value on the fact that 
violations of trade regulation were also sanctioned by civil law. The agencies felt that a main 
benefit of a codification would be that Nordic consumers could effectively use it to negotiate 
settlements with entrepreneurs.73  
The question of a codification came up again in 2001, in the report by Krüger and 
Møgelvang-Hansen referred to above. The report proposed a new section to be incorporated 
into Nordic marketing legislation, applicable for consumer sales and to subject to similar 
identification rules as the SGA: 
“§B. Information displayed in commercial advertising shall be considered part of a 
subsequent contract with a consumer concerning the product or service in question 
unless there are reasons to assume that the information displayed had no impact on the 
consumer’s evaluation of the contract.”74 
                                                          
69 Kom 1990:20 ”Har en avtalspart i samband med marknadsföring givit uppgifter om pris, produktens 
egenskaper eller avtalsprestation i övrig, vilka kan antas ha inverkat på avtalet, utgör uppgifterna en del av 
det avtal som ingåtts.” 
70 Kom 1990:20 
71 Held between 21-22.11.1990 in Espoo, Finland 
72 Nybergh 1992 p.101  
73 Nybergh 1992 p.107 
74 Krüger & Møgelvang-Hansen 2001 p.187 
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These attempts at a codification showed the point of tension between contract law and 
marketing information. That these attempts failed indicated that the proposals were too 
radical to enact, considering that contract law is inherently quite static. In particular, the 
sanction systems proposed were a general binding effect of marketing information. It was 
most likely that the legislator did not see that there would be a benefit in adjusting the rules 
of contract formation. Consequently, any future codification of a marketing rule would 
probably not be feasible if it did not also contain a more developed sanction system.  
 
2.3 The difference between a defect and the insurance rule 
 
My hypothesis is that it was the refined sanction system of the Finnish insurance rule that 
led to its enactment when the other proposals, outlined above, failed. This point of tension, 
focuses attention on the difference between the insurance rule and the construction of non-
conformity or defect in the SGA.  
The Finnish insurance rule sanctions unacceptable marketing through the rules of contract 
formation, so that the contract is considered to be in force to the effect understood by the 
policyholder. The rule thus merges the duty of disclosure and the liability for voluntary 
marketing information. The rule signifies that in cases where an advertisement or sales pitch 
gives an unacceptable impression about a subsequent contract, the buyer is protected, even 
against standard contract terms to the contrary or in situations where the seller is unaware of 
the buyer’s mistake. At the same time, the rule gives the buyer a right to a performance, and 
the contract that regulates the performance changes to reflect the information given in 
marketing. 
Kari Hoppu has compared the Finnish SGA (together with the CPA) to the ICA, and found 
that only the ICA regulates the content of a contract, whereas the two other acts regulate 
what is a breach of contract, by constructing a defect in the product sold, due to marketing 
information.75 Hoppu suspects that this difference, that the ICA covers all types of 
information and the SGA only information on the properties and use of the product, was due 
to the different nature of the products that were regulated.76  
                                                          
75 Hoppu 2004 p.302 
76 Hoppu 2004 p.309 
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In insurance, the product is the contract itself, which means that legislation affects single 
contracts as well as pools of mass standardized insurance products. Insurance has originated 
from probability calculus that gave rise to a new kind of rationality, a way of thinking about 
the world that was based on the regular occurrence of actual events, instead of the reasons 
behind these events.77 Contracting norms affect directly the product development and 
marketing strategies of insurers.78  The clauses in insurance policies are individualized terms 
and standard terms, which can be categorized into particular standard terms relating to the 
insurance product in question, for example a home insurance, as well as general standard 
terms, that concern for example the payment of premiums.79   
The different nature of goods and insurances does not entirely explain why other marketing 
information about goods, unrelated to properties or use, does not trigger a defect in the SGA. 
After all contract clauses refer basically to two facts, those that exists because of the contract, 
such as the contract terms themselves or their performance or breach, and those that that 
exist independent of the contract, such as taxation law or the properties and use of the goods 
that were sold. Hypothetically, it would thus be possible to extend binding effects of 
marketing information to all aspects of contracting, so that the aspects that parties can control 
would change, and the aspects that they cannot control would be remedied through damages. 
At the same time, the defect construction would become unnecessary. 
 The established sanction system in the SGA is however based on the concept of defect (non-
conformity) in the good that has been sold, and it seems to be this basic concept of 
constructing a defect, rather than the different products themselves, that explains why the 
SGA and ICA differ.   
The defect construction originates from Roman law and has entered Nordic law through 
German jurisprudence. It is comprised of two elements. The seller is firstly liable for any 
guarantees he or she has made about the properties of the goods to the buyer. This is a 
specific liability (called vendito-emptio in Latin), that is based on the agreement between 
the parties. The second form of liability is based on an abstract determination of the general 
properties of a certain category of goods (in ancient Rome such “pre-guaranteed” goods were 
                                                          
77 Ewald 2003 p.30-31 
78 Norio-Timonen 2012 p.47 
79 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.2 
16 
 
for example slaves and draught animals) that the seller is liable for regardless of any 
guarantee.80  
In the SGA, this second form of liability is seen in the rule that goods must also be fit for the 
purpose for which similar goods are ordinarily used (section 17§). André has noted that there 
has been a distinction between the two forms of liability in the remedies which were 
available according to the SGA (i.e. correction, price reduction, avoidance of the contract or 
damages), but that this distinction was disappearing, and thus marketing information could 
lead to all applicable remedies.81  
The sanction system of the Finnish insurance rule is based on the marketing itself, as the 
marketing influence the content of the contract. Thus the threshold for sanctions is lower and 
awards can be significantly higher than what the rules on non-conformity would allow.  The 
applicant’s understanding is determined, according to the preparatory works, with objective 
criteria that correspond to the reasonable understanding of an average applicant in the same 
situation. Objectivity means that applicants are for example presumed to read, with 
reasonable care, the written material that the insurer provides them.82 The applicant’s 
subjective criteria are also legally relevant, for example the applicants advanced age or 
special circumstances, if the insurer or its representative knew or should have known about 
them.83  
These loose criteria of the applicants understanding can be interpreted in the light of section 
31:1 of the Insurance Company Act (2008/521) according to which marketing that does not 
contain necessary information on the financial security of the client, is always unfair 
business practice, and in light of the general rules of second chapter of the CPA on the 
regulation of marketing.  
 
Comparison of liability for marketing violations in the sale of goods and insurances 
in Finland84 
Situation  Goods (SGA and CPA) Insurances (ICA) 
                                                          
80 André 1984 p.274 
81 André 1984 p. 274, 589-590 
82 HE 114/1993 vp p.29, On how these objective criteria have been clarified in legal praxis see Norio-
Timonen 2010 p.67-72 
83 HE 114/93 p. 31 cf. Norio-Timonen 1997 p.139; Hoppu 2004 p.310 
84 Hoppu 2004 p.308-314;   
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The seller is in good faith.    
If the information 
concerns properties or use 
→ non-conformity. 
If the information is incomplete, 
misleading or incorrect   
→ the contract is in force as 
understood by the policyholder. 
The information is 
provided by third parties.  
If the information is given 
by the previous level of 
the chain of supply or on 
behalf of the seller → 
information is treated as 
the seller's unless the 
seller is in good faith. 
If the insurer’s representative has 
authority to give information on the 
policy and the information is 
incomplete, misleading or incorrect 
→ the contract is in force as 
understood by the policyholder. 
The information is 
corrected as efficiently as 
the wrong information by 
the conclusion of contract. 
The correction is assumed 
to have reached the buyer. 
The insurer needs to prove that the 
applicant has received the correction.  
The information does not 
influence the decision to 
purchase. 
There is no commercial 
effect → seller is not 
bound to the information.  
This situation is irrelevant. If the 
information is incomplete, misleading 
or incorrect → the contract is in force 
as understood by the policyholder.  
 
Finnish legal literature presents a generally supportive view of the insurance rule. The 
Finnish rule has created an accessible protection for policyholders and replaced the need to 
rely on other types of sanctions when the insurer neglects its information duties. Norio-
Timonen has noted that for a consumer, the normal consequences of non-conformity would 
in most situations be unsatisfactory.85 The compensation for non-conformity in the sale of 
goods depends on the applicable remedy, for example negative interest or a refund of the 
insurance premiums would not be in the interest of the policyholder if the accident has 
already occurred. Consequently, the concrete “remedy” of the insurance rule is that the 
insurance cover is extended, either by increasing the insurance money or amount of risk that 
is insured.86 Koponen writes that the rule is effective, as it provides the right type of 
protection for insurance products, it highlights the responsibility of both parties and it works 
when it should.87 
                                                          
85 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.137; One practical benefit of the extension of coverage is that according to good 
insurance practice the insurer has an obligation to use its resources and expertise to evaluate the extent of 
the damage. 
86 In case the insurance was not bought, due to marketing information, and this causes loss, general rules of 
tort apply. Norio-Timonen 2010 p.74 
87 Koponen 2008 p.84. Koponen adds: ”By this I mean that the criteria for applicability are relatively 
stringent, and when the rule is applied, the circumstances of particular cases are adequately considered. 
The loss is channeled to the party that is responsible for it. If the policyholder neglects his or her duty to 
check the policy [selonottovelvollisuus], he or she bears the loss. If the insurer neglects its duty to inform 
[on syyllistynyt tiedonantovirheeseen], it bears the loss.” 
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2.4 Further points of tension 
 
In the light of these differences between the Finnish insurance rule and contract law, it is 
interesting to look at how some points of tension presented by the Finnish ICA have been 
described in legal literature and other sources. I will focus on the questions of contract 
formation, liberalist theory and finally on how the Swedish and the “European ICA” differ 
from the Finnish ICA. 
The first point of tension is whether the Finnish rule regulates contract interpretation or 
contract formation. According to the preparatory works of the reformed ICA, the section 
reflected the legal principles of the defect rules of the sale of goods act and consumer 
protection law, whereby the insurer’s precontractual information was essential to the 
interpretation of the contract.88 Consistent with this conception of a remedy for defect, the 
Insurance Complaints Board has in its recommendations, for example in case VKL 636/04, 
said the policyholder had the right to have a mistake corrected.  
Interpretation and mistake are however not entirely accurate terms to describe the rule, as it 
actually does not influence the interpretation of the contract as much as determine the 
contract terms themselves.89 While the language of the rule has been the same since 1994,90 
subsequent preparatory works have gradually recognized that the rule changes contracts.91 
When the old Insurance Company Act (1062/1979) was amended in the year 2000, the 
formulation in the preparatory works was that a mistake caused by incomplete, incorrect or 
misleading marketing was “sort of corrected”, by changing the policy to reflect the 
information that had been given.92 Finally, in the preparatory works of 2009, when the ICA 
was amended, the rule was described straight forward as one that “influences the content” 
of the contract.93  
                                                          
88 HE 1993/114 vp p.13  
89 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.137 note 159 
90 The scope of the rule was expanded in 2010 also to investments that may be linked to the insurance 
(Section 5.1) 
91 It is outside the scope of this research to examine whether legal praxis in applying the rule has also 
evolved since 1994. Koponen has noted that the Insurance Dispute Board VKL has shown restraint in 
applying the rule restrictively, and that the rule is secondary to the applicant’s duty to check the policy. 
Koponen 2008 p.85   
92 HE 206/2000 vp p.16 ”virhe ikään kuin korjataan” 
93 HE 63/2009 vp p.4;  
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The second point of tension is whether the rule adjusted to contracting practice or whether 
it steered contracting. Häyhä and Norio-Timonen have had differing views on how the new 
ICA relates to liberal tradition. Häyhä published his dissertation, “Contract, Law and the 
Insurance Business”94 in 1996, two years after the ICA entered into force. Häyhä examined 
if contract law had undergone, as other academics have proposed, a transformation from the 
liberal free-market model towards a “welfarist” model that protects weaker parties. He used 
insurance contract law to test this proposed change, and concluded that many changes in 
contract law that had been classified as consumer protections could in fact be understood as 
continuing the liberal tradition. This was especially the case for insurance law, as contracting 
had changed from individually negotiated contracts to contracts of mass-character.95 Häyhä 
thus criticized the notion that insurance contract law primarily reflected consumer 
protections and that the particular nature of the insurance business best explained why the 
ICA was different from general contract in many respects.96 He claimed that attempts, by 
the Finnish state, to steer the insurance business were quite limited, and that the new ICA 
primarily codified established trade practices.97  
In her critique of Häyhä’s theory, Norio-Timonen noted that the absence of regulation is a 
fundamental element of liberalist contract theory, which did not support Häyhä’s hypothesis 
that insurance contract law regulation, such as increased information duties, were compatible 
with liberalism. Norio-Timonen claimed instead that the ICA reflected a market rationality 
that was geared towards correcting market failures, as well as towards promoting the 
principle of loyalty in contracting.98 This critique of Häyhä by Norio-Timonen, in my view 
boils down to the question whether the modern collectivist system of contract law, that 
promotes collective and public interests, really is the antithesis of liberalist contract law that 
emphasizes private autonomy.99  
The third point of tension is that from abroad the Finnish rule is not well understood. This 
can be seen specifically in Sweden and in the “European ICA”, that is the Principles of 
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL). The PEICL are the result of an academic 
                                                          
94 Häyhä 1996 Sopimus, laki ja vakuutustoiminta 
95 Häyhä 1996 p.361–362 
96 Häyhä 1996 p.87 
97 Häyhä 1996 p.214, 116 
98 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.148-149 Norio-Timonen points out that the duty to disclose essential limitations 
of the insurance coverage is also compatible with the doctrine of the regulating surprising and harsh 
standard terms. 
99 Timonen 1997 p.37 
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exercise, and it is envisioned that PEICL could be issued as a voluntary optional instrument, 
in the form of an EU-regulation.  
In the Swedish ICA (2005:104), a notable difference to the Finnish ICA is that the insurer’s 
failure to emphasize clauses that contain surprising or essential limitations to the insurance 
cover does not change the policy to the effect understood by the applicant like the Finnish 
rule does, but only renders these clauses ineffective.100 Professor Bertil Bengtsson101 was a 
member of the Swedish ICA committee in the 1970’s and 80’s, when the Finnish and 
Swedish acts were reformed. Thirty years later, in 2015, he reflected on how the Swedish 
ICA turned out:  
“The Swedish ICA rules on civil liability are difficult to reconcile with general 
principles of contract law. It is after all an unusual consequence that a contract 
automatically changes due to the breach of one of the parties (without annulment or 
termination). One is tempted to ask, whether we could not have, like Finland, relied 
on general principles of contract law in the case of defective information, which at 
times could bring about an extension of coverage.”102  
 
Bengtsson’s view is interesting, as the Finnish insurance rule is usually seen as an exception 
to general contract law.103 Bengtsson writes that he nevertheless prefers the current Swedish 
rule, and he then implies that the Finnish rule complicates contracting. He notes that 
policyholders often ask for a specific type of coverage, and such a rule would force insurers 
to emphasize limitations at this very early stage, which would make precontractual 
information harder to digest.104  
Bengtsson’s concerns are however not shared in Finnish legal literature. The Finnish VKL 
has given numerous recommendations for disputes where the client had asked for specific 
coverage (For example VKL 742/06 and 54/02).105 The Finnish doctrine is that even though 
                                                          
100 “2§ Innan en konsumentförsäkring meddelas skall försäkringsbolaget lämna information som underlättar 
kundens bedömning av försäkringsbehovet och val av försäkring. Informationen skall på ett enkelt sätt 
återge det huvudsakliga innehållet i de försäkringsvillkor som kunden behöver ha kännedom om för 
att kunna bedöma kostnaden för och omfattningen av försäkringen. Viktiga begränsningar av 
försäkringsskyddet skall tydligt framgå. […] 
4 § Snarast efter avtalsslutet skall försäkringsbolaget […]upplysa om försäkringsvillkorens innehåll och 
särskilt framhålla […] villkor som med hänsyn till försäkringens beteckning eller övriga omständigheter 
utgör en oväntad och väsentlig begränsning av försäkringsskyddet […] 
8 § Om ett villkor av sådant slag som anges i 4 § inte har särskilt framhållits av försäkringsbolaget vare 
sig före eller efter avtalsslutet, får det inte åberopas av bolaget.”(Emphasis added)  
101 Professor emeritus of insurance law, at the University of Stockholm 
102 Bengtsson 2015 p.211. (Emphasis added) 
103 Norio-Timonen 2010 p.74, Hoppu 2004 p.306 Hoppu & Hemmo 2006 p.8,51 
104 Bengtsson 2015 p.211 
105 Koponen 2008 p.18 
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the applicant asked for a specific type of coverage, the insurer must still inform the client 
about other relevant policies that it sells.106 In Finnish insurance law, the duty to inform the 
client about major exclusions depends on two questions: 1) what would an ordinary applicant 
regard as a major exclusion and 2) if the insurance was purchased face-to-face, what can be 
regarded as a major exclusion based on the applicants specific circumstances.107  
On the contrary, the way the Swedish ICA deals with precontractual information seems very 
complicated. Eva Lindell-Frantz has noted that in Swedish contract law the relevant trade 
regulation and private law rules are not to be found in one place, and as the insurers defective 
information can lead to different consequences in different circumstances, it is difficult to 
know exactly what the duties of the insurer are. Lindell-Frantz also noted that the Swedish 
rules, while they guarantee a lot of information to the policyholder, do not really address the 
real problem that applicants mostly choose insurances haphazardly and do not have the time, 
energy or interest to read this information.108 The implication seems to be that Swedish 
insurance law does not find the right balance between too much and too little information.  
The PEICL purport to reflect the status quo of contract law in the EU member states.109 The 
comparative notes of the PEICL present the different ways that member states deal regulate 
insurance contracts, grouped into legal families or regimes of law. The PEICL do not 
regulate marketing, but focus instead on insurers a duty to assist the applicant in selecting 
an insurance policy. According to the notes of the PEICL, if the insurer fails its duty to assist 
the policyholder, some member states allow for the modification of the insurance contract to 
accommodate reasonable expectations, and that Sweden has one of the more extensive duties 
to assist.110 Consequently, the PEICL ignore the facts that 1) the Finnish marketing liability 
rule also applies to any information given when the insurer or its representative assists the 
applicant, and 2) that the rule regulates contract formation, not modification. This distinction 
is important, because the general clause 36 of the Nordic Contract Acts allows for the 
adjustment of contracts, with regard to conditions prevailing at the conclusion of contracts. 
The threshold for any adjustment (if this is indeed meant by the term modification in PEICL) 
                                                          
106 Norio-Timonen 1997 p.116  
107 HE 114/1993, p.27  
108 Lindell-Frantz 2007 p.343, 350  
109 PEICL 2016 p.6 I9; In PEICL, the insurer’s information duties are limited to the provision of pre-
contractual documents and a duty to warn about inconsistencies in the cover. To avoid liability for a breach 
of this duty, the insurer needs to prove it acted without fault, and the circumstances and mode of 
contracting determine the extent of the duty to warn about inconsistencies. 
110 PEICL 2016 p.124 (C5) and p.126 N6 
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of a contract is thus much higher in Sweden, than the threshold for contract formation in 
Finland, on the basis of the expectations of the policyholder.      
This question of precontractual assistance is topical, as the Insurance Distribution Directive 
(IDD)111, to be transposed by February 2018, introduces a demands-and-needs test for all 
sellers of insurance products that sell directly to customers.112 The IDD requires sellers to 
ask about these demands and needs from the applicant and to make an objective 
recommendation, so that the applicant can make an informed decision (art. 20.1). The PEICL 
in turn propose, as a common European rule, only the duty to warn about inconsistencies in 
cover, and the insurer is still excused if it was not negligent: 
Article 2:202 Duty to Warn about Inconsistencies in the Cover  
(1) When concluding the contract, the insurer shall warn the applicant of any 
inconsistencies between the cover offered and the applicant’s requirements of which the 
insurer is or ought to be aware, taking into consideration the circumstances and mode 
of contracting […] (2) In the event of a breach of para. 1 (a) the insurer shall indemnify 
the policyholder against all losses resulting from the breach of this duty to warn unless 
the insurer acted without fault […] 
To conclude, as it is not well understood in Finland that the insurance rule affects contract 
formation, instead of non-conformity, it is no surprise that the rule is not well understood 
abroad. The rule might be better understood if it is looked at on a higher level of abstraction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance 
distribution 
112 It will replace the previous Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD). The IDD contains minimum 
harmonization, so member states can ‘gold-plate’ it by adding their own requirements. Out-law.com. 2016. 
23 
 
3. The theoretical implications of the insurance rule  
 
The different points of tension outlined above had are closely connected on an abstract level. 
The theoretical problems these points of tension raise are the questions of 1) how can 
contract law accommodate indefinite promises (that are not offers) becoming part of a 
contract, 2) are autonomy and increased regulation compatible or incompatible and 3) what 
are the criteria for good contract law. A need for refined arguments about what is better or 
worse is made evident by the history of failed attempts to reform the Nordic Contract Acts, 
as well as by the pressures of European harmonization to the Nordic consumer protection 
model. 
Bert Lehrberg has in his book on practical legal method noted that legal rules are only 
understandable in relation to the reality where the rule is applied, and in relation to the values 
rules fulfills. To this end, he presents legal rules in a three-dimensional field.113 
In his process, a) reality influences 
values so that b) rules acquire new 
content through lawmaking 
(objectives). c) Reality is directly 
influenced by legal rules as people 
generally follow them, but legal rules 
mainly influence (d) the values of 
society. These values then (e) reflect in 
the way people behave. Finally, (f) real 
circumstances significantly determine 
when and how legal rules are 
applied.114   
This complex process shows that a change in law serves different functions and can have 
unintended consequences.115 The significant effect of the insurance rule, if it would become 
a general contract law rule, is that the role of promise and agreement between the parties 
would change, as marketing information would increasingly determine the content of the 
contract. After all the legal consequence of the insurer’s contractual liability for information 
                                                          
113 Lehrberg 2014 p.103 
114 Lehrberg 2014 p.104 
115 Lehrberg 2014 p.104 
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in marketing, is that the contract is considered to be in force to the effect understood by the 
policyholder. As promise and agreement are also very much moral and economic question, 
the consequences of such a change in contract law can be examined in social norms and 
economic behavior (values and reality in Lehrberg’s presentation).  
 
3.1 The power of reason and interaction    
 
The interaction between law and reality, like the interaction between law and values, works 
both ways. As a starting point, it can be noted that Lehrberg’s terminology might give the 
impression that values are not real, with the implication that the effects of law on values are 
not that important. However, such an impression does not recognize that it is possible to 
study subjective phenomenon, and find verifiable truths about them. In fact, changes in the 
law are only conceivable because the law, just like economics, is a human science. 
Philosopher John Searle has noted that humans have the unique capacity, among the living 
creatures, to actively create their own subjective reality, through a biological process in the 
brain. Without a human observer, in his subjective capacity, there would be just the brute 
facts of the world that would exist regardless of us.116 Banknotes and contracts, as brute facts 
are just fibers and molecules.117 
Lehrberg’s values, just like legal rules, are thus an observer relative and ontologically 
(having to do with existence) subjective phenomenon. It is nevertheless possible to give an 
epistemically (having to do with knowledge) objective account of both values and the law, 
even though values and the law would not exist (as ontologically objective things) without 
us observing them.  In other words, research can say, verifiably, what is true or false about 
values and the law. 
According to Juha Pöyhönen, there is a mechanism, at the deep structures of society where 
economics, politics and law are not distinct.118 As I understand it, Searle describes this 
mechanism when he notes that through “speech acts”, representations of ontological 
subjectivity become epistemically objective status functions declarations. This means people 
can collectively assign functions to objects that go beyond their physical properties. The 
                                                          
116 Searle 2006 p. 13-15; Searle 2015 lecture  
117 Searle 1995 p.2 
118 Pöyhönen 1986 p.374, 376 Pöyhönen calls this ethical rationality material law that is founded on societal 
justice. Formal law would be a contradicting rationality, based on private autonomy. Pöyhönen p.375 n.13  
25 
 
constitutive rules of a status function, as a formula, tell us that X counts as Y in C. In practice 
the rules can instruct that a bishop moves diagonally in a game of chess, or that the winner 
of a democratic election will be the president of a nation. Because people accept the deontic 
powers (of or relating to moral obligation) of status functions, societies hold themselves 
together. 119   
The purpose of this long-winded philosophical introduction is to emphasize that the effect 
of deontic power (of status functions) is that people accept reasons to act independent of 
their preferences (Searle uses the term desires). According to Searle, this powerful 
motivating force is not adequately represented in economics, a discipline that focuses on the 
fulfillment of preferences. Behavior is not exhaustively explained by preferences, because 
when people accept valid reasons to honor their obligations, they only form the preference 
afterwards to do the required action. For example, because people accept their obligations, 
they form the preference to get up early in the morning to go to work and pay their debts.120   
Another misunderstanding that might arise from Lehrberg’s chart is that real circumstances 
do not only determine when and how legal rules are applied, because “reality” also directly 
influences the content of legal rules.  Individual self-interest drives economic action, but this 
action also produces social co-operation. 121 Adam Smith has called this the ‘invisible 
hand’.122 Compared to Searle’s deontological power of status functions, the invisible hand 
operates primarily not through reason, but through the forces of supply and demand.  While 
Searle notes status functions are pretty much everywhere123, we are also faced with 
innumerable interactions over the course of our lives. The key difference, as I understand it, 
is that repeated human interactions produce a strong non-rational power that steers social 
order, and this power is distinct from the equally strong deontic power that steers rational 
behavior.124  
These two powers can be seen in action in the type of legal regulation that has been 
characterized in jurisprudence as “market rationality”, which interferes into the market 
system in order to fulfil collective or public goals. Of course, the goals may vary from 
facilitating rational behavior through information duties to correcting market failures on 
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welfarist grounds.125 Market failures are situations of non-pareto optimality when prices fail 
to reflect the full social costs and benefits of activities.126 Markets fail not only due to lack 
of efficiency, but also when they produce politically, socially or ethically undesirable 
effects.127 According to Pöyhönen, in order to influence economic activity, the legal system 
must be distinct from economic activity as otherwise the existing state of affairs is only 
reinforced.128 
The premise for market rationality is economic analysis that exposes the economic 
operational environment and regularities in human behavior. The variables that influence 
real world economics are innumerable, so the economic analysis of law is necessarily based 
on dynamic models.129 Markets can for example be observed through prices and how sellers 
and buyers organize themselves. The price mechanism fulfills the functions of transmitting 
information, providing incentives and distributing income.130  
There is of course no clear delimitation when non-rational power becomes rational power, 
because as soon as systematic non-rational behavior is identified, it acquires a status function 
or rational explanation. An example of market rationality is that courts accept the price on 
the market as a starting point for determining whether to correct an unjust price agreed 
between the parties. On the other hand, the tendency to let the markets alone is seen in the 
criticism of courts, when they directly intervene in market relationships, that they are 
paternalistic and redistributive.131 
 
3.2 Norms and the law 
 
Proposals for a new legal rule, examples of which were presented in chapter 2, are usually 
not enacted if they are not accepted by the representatives of a sufficient majority. A proposal 
should thus primarily make sense, and rely on the authority of the lawmaker. In other words, 
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why do people accept deontic power? According to Searle the term acceptance, is 
interchangeable with “collective recognition and does not imply approval.132 He writes: 
The procedures [for representing states of affair], or at least some of them, become 
conventionalized, become generally accepted […] given collective intentionality, if 
anyone intentionally engages in one of these procedures, then other members of the 
group have a right to expect that the procedures are being followed correctly […] 
conventions are arbitrary, but once they are settled they give the participants a right to 
specific expectations. They are normative.133 
 
The key point in why a proposed rule would be accepted by for example a parliament is that 
the rule reflects what is or should be normal, because when something is recognized as 
normal, that which deviates from it is abnormal. This duality of meaning is captured in the 
term norms. Norms are difficult to conceptualize, as the word has two distinct and 
established generic meanings, as an order or obligation, and as a description or standard, but 
at the same time these meanings are interdependent.134  
Like norm and normal, prescription and description express is and ought and constantly 
interact with each other, so that a statistical average can become a prescription to be obeyed, 
or obeying a rule can become so common that it forms a descriptive average.135 In other 
words, it is normal to obey a prescriptive norm, and normal to conform to a descriptive 
norm.136 Norms, when their dual qualities are recognized, can be understood in the ordaining 
sense of normal137. Norms are a common denominator and a relationship benchmark. This 
means that a norm is both a standard and a means through which a group communicates with 
itself.138 
A legal rule also has a descriptive, norm-producing function. The dual function of norms is 
often omitted when describing the law, with the inherent risk that societal effects are not 
adequately accounted for. The word legal norm is commonly used only in its prescriptive, 
                                                          
132 Searle 2010 p.57 
133 Searle 2010 p.87 
134cf. Koivisto 2008 p.7.  
135 Koivisto 2008 p.7, 11 Siltala claims that it is not necessary to derive ought from is, as the description 
itself can be prescriptive, as he says is the case for a promise. Siltala 2003 p.604 However, promises always 
presuppose some understanding about whether the promise is normal or exceptional. Koivisto notes that a 
purely prescriptive norm is functionally identical with the law. Koivisto 2008 p.15. I would call a purely 
prescriptive norm a command.  
136 Koivisto 2008 p.7 
137 Martire 2011 p.26 
138 Ewald 1990 p.72       
28 
 
norm-enforcing sense.139 There is no concept of “legal normal”.140 Some empirical average, 
for example a baseline for emissions, might be codified, but the codification itself is not 
understood as “normal”, it is a prescription to be obeyed. Law-breaking is also usually 
sanctioned in a targeted and specific way, and the sanctions are enforced. The law recognizes 
rough categorizations of behavior and is usually indifferent to the social context.141 
Like the term “values”, the terms “morals” and “morality” do not convey the duality of 
meaning of norms, of being simultaneously descriptive and the prescriptive. A finer 
distinction between the norms and morals can be found in Foucauldian ethics. There are 
moral systems and humans have a moral faculty. Institutions such as the church, school or 
family or the legal system, propose moral systems and moral faculty is reflected in the 
actions and reflections of the ethical individual. The individual in turn recognizes his or her 
morally problematic areas and establishes, through self-reflection, his or her moral 
obligations.142  
Searle claims that most normative constraints of a society (specifically presuppositions, 
attitudes, dispositions, capacities and practices) are not a type of power that would be 
exercised by any subject, because such power is are not codified, explicit or conscious.143 
However it is clear that regal rules can affect our attitudes and that many social conventions 
are not arbitrary, which is seen in the way legislation has intruded into many spheres of life 
that were previously private affairs. 
 
3.2.1 The law and normalization 
 
According to Michel Foucault and his student, François Ewald144, power has evolved and 
with it the law. The juridical concept of the law is that the state, symbolized by a sovereign, 
is generally uninterested in the lives of its people, and ensures obedience of the population 
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by sporadic displays of spectacular violence. With the advent of modernity and technological 
development, the normative state has replaced the juridical state, because a new way of 
managing society was called for in particular by expanding trade and the demands of the war 
industries. These needed for standardized products, workers and soldiers.145  
 The normative state uses the dual function of norms as a way to manage society without 
requiring force or obedience.146 For example, in armies, prisons and schools new types of 
discipline, surveillance and final exams placed each individual under surveillance, within 
ever more detailed and efficient relational categories. Foucault’s famous example of this 
development is the panopticon, or central tower in new prison architecture, that let the guards 
observe prisoners without the prisoners knowing it. Eventually, the same effect was achieved 
with the guard tower empty, because the prisoners still behaved as if someone was watching. 
Norms offered a “matrix by which to interpret society and a scale by which to judge and 
differentiate each individual from the next”.147  
This technique of management is called normalization.  Normalization entailed that the 
individuals observe themselves in relation to that which is the standard, or the new normal.148 
Normalization is at once “a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an 
optimum towards which one must move”.149 
Legal norms are a combination of natural and artificial norms, as law both creates norms and 
expresses norms that would exist regardless of the legislator.150 Ewald claims that actually, 
there is no true legislator and that the task of the parliaments and other institutions that make 
the law is not to create norms, but to decide which norms should be binding.151 To Ida 
Koivisto, this means that the world of facts contains within itself a normative order, based 
on social conventions, that prevents anarchy even if no lawmaker would exists. Law thus 
creates norms, but also expresses those norms that would exist also without any act of 
recognition.152  
The theory of normalization is hard to reconcile with the traditional view of contracting. This 
contradiction was seen in Norio-Timonen’s critique of Häyhä, referred to above. Doesn’t 
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freedom of contract, whether a natural right or guaranteed by positive law, precede any 
standard or common practice when interpreting contracts? This contradiction can be solved 
by distinguishing a norm from a command. Normalization created a cohesive social group, 
unto which the law placed the universal status of legal subjects. On the other hand, the law 
activated, facilitated and implemented the techniques of normalization, which distinguished 
and revealed every individual to the common benchmark of being a legal subject. The rule 
of law can only exists on an area that has been normalized. Freedom to make choices and to 
enter into contracts is essential to normalization, because freedom separates a command from 
a norm.153  
The rule of law not only protects individual freedom, but is in itself a benchmark of 
normalization. The shift from command to norm means that authority disappears, and what 
is left is the “discourse of power” that makes human interactions predictable. A command 
only serves its giver and nothing else that would have a wider purpose. A command does not 
allow for its object to decide how to fulfill the action that is demanded. A norm, on the other 
hand, gives guidance to an actor that decides for him or herself.154 Thus, on a deep societal 
level there is no dilemma between power and emancipation. On the contrary, as the state 
does not have the power to enforce its will without the technique of normalization, the state 
has a vested interest in maintaining party autonomy. 
 
3.2.2 Rules, principles and the duty to adjudicate  
 
Legal norms are conceptualized as rules and principles. The basic distinction is that rules are 
applied in an “all-or-nothing” way to solve the case, they typically categorize their object in 
a binary fashion and ascribe a precise legal consequence. Also, the exceptions to a rule can 
be enumerated precisely. Principles, on the other hand, do not entirely dictate the outcome 
of a case, but instead identify the constituent elements for a certain judgment, but the 
judgment can ultimately be different due to the circumstances of case or other stronger 
principles.155 Contract law is inherently oriented towards principles, as they connect the law 
to contracting practices and social norms.156 Siltala notes that principles are intertwined with 
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different societal values and objectives.157 The distinction between a rule and a principle is 
quite fluid, as many legal rules are very open-ended. Likewise, the codification of a legal 
principle, developed in jurisprudence, gives it some characteristics of a rule, but not all of 
them. According to Pöyhönen, using open terms does not in itself change a rule into a 
principle. This is because, if the court can determine that the term is applicable, the rule is 
applicable, not as much as possible, but fully, to its mandated legal consequence.158 
On closer analysis, the insurance rule is devoid of content without a connection to 
contracting practice, because it is written in very open terms. It obliges the insurer to provide 
the necessary information and sanctions for giving incorrect or misleading information, by 
mandating that otherwise the policy is in force to the effect understood by the policyholder. 
According to section 5 of the act, unless the applicant does not want such information, the 
insurer must provide any information that the applicant may need to assess his insurance 
requirement and select the insurance, such as details on the insurer’s insurance products, 
insurance premiums and insurance terms and conditions, as well as point out any major 
exclusions in the cover provided. This raises the question of what the content of insurance 
contracts is, if the terminology of the key terms are open. Seen in a societal context, this 
open terminology highlights the power of courts and the VKL to influence the (non-legal) 
norms of insurance contracting.  
Nordic jurists, by and large, seem reluctant to use the term gap-filling, and instead prefer the 
term interpretation. If legal rules or custom do not give an answer, Nordic legal practice 
hides the problem of “gap-filling” by constructing an artificial common will of the parties or 
by applying the doctrine of necessary conditions.159 The term interpretation has traditionally 
been used for example textual, contextual and risk-division considerations. Increasingly, 
legal interpretation is detached from what the parties would have wanted. Instead, courts can 
determine, with the help of default rules, what result would be reasonable and societally 
acceptable (for example NJA 2009 s. 672).160 The reluctance to use the term gap filling, is 
due to the constitutionally limited and fine-tuned norm-producing mandate of the Nordic 
courts. Contract law precedents have higher interpretative value if they help to understand a 
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legislative clause that is widely applicable than if the precedent concretely specifies a 
contract clause.   
The norm-producing function of precedents is controversial, but this political lawmaking of 
the court is a fact that can be seen in the way Nordic courts have regularly changed the law, 
often because the legislator has remained passive and intentionally leaves known but wicked 
problems to the courts.161 This is possible, because the courts’ duty to adjudicate is accepted, 
in other words the rulings, though they are prescriptive, are perceived as normal. Without 
this duty, the rule of law would be undermined. This duty includes the notion that judgments 
for any given legal problem need to be unambiguous. In the process of arriving at a judgment, 
judges weigh and balance different arguments and facts of the case, but the judgments 
inevitably arrive to a single outcome. Adjudication by the courts produces norms, explicitly 
or implicitly, as legal rules could not evolve if judges or norm-enforcers only applied 
preexisting rules.162  
In applying legal principles the courts define a precise level of applicability in a precise set 
of circumstances. This is simultaneously interpretation and gap filling. In other words, the 
court presents a truth about the law, because any other level of applicability in the same 
circumstances would not be more or less applicable or relevant, but indeed false. Ronald 
Dworkin has proposed that there is a single right answer to be found for legal problems, 
whereas a legal realist would argue that laws are intentionally vague and porous, so a judge 
has discretion based on his convictions, and law is reduced to politics.163 Dworkin argued 
that skeptical legal theories are logically unsustainable, as skepticism is in itself an 
unprovable interpretation about the nature of law.164 Dworkin maintained that legal 
interpretation is not arbitrary, but derives from a practitioner's instinct, experience and 
training. The judge knows instinctively that he or she belongs to a collective tradition of 
legal interpretation, and can feel the right answer to the problem. The single right answer is 
the one that acquits the interpreter from interpretive responsibility towards this tradition.165  
Keeping in mind that the law and social institutions are ontologically subjective, the idea of 
normalizing judgments seems compatible with Ronald Dworkin’s principle of one law, 
according to which there is a single right answer to even the hardest cases, with the twist that 
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the right answer does not exist ex ante but manifests itself ex post. Dworkin’s theories have 
been criticized as incompatible with complex pluralist societies where different groups have 
different ideas of what is right and wrong.166 However, even in pluralist societies, different 
groups necessarily have a basic common understanding of what the law is, even though the 
groups disagree on what the law should be. As regards the discretion that judges have, the 
one right answer is found equilibrium between with the different powers, outlined above, 
that bear on lawmaking. 
A single right answer is correct as an epistemically objective account of the law, but it does 
not preclude the norm producing function of the judge, because he or she has the recognized 
(does not imply approval) power to do so. To conclude, I have tried to show that norm 
production is not arbitrary, but follows the logic of normalization. Consequently, the 
legislator can subtly change the perception of what is seen as normal contract formation, to 
include indefinite promises. The open terms of the insurance rule also emphasize the norm 
producing function of courts and the instrumental relationship to good business practice. 
 
3.3 Contracting and the law  
The theoretical problem of the criteria for good contract law needs to be examined in relation 
to contracting, where the effects of legal rules can be observed and analyzed. The 
implications of insurance contract law on general contract law can be formulated as a 
question: Would the insurance rule work as a general rule?  
The first starting point for this analysis is that at the two regimes are different as to the 
parties’ possibilities to negotiate contract terms. The Finnish ICA is semi-immutable (or 
semi-mandatory) for the benefit of consumers as well as a wide range of small businesses 
and legal entities such as housing associations that are deemed to be in a weaker party in the 
contractual relationship with the insurer. This means that the terms of the contract cannot be 
worse than the ICA allows, but they can be better. The rules of contract formation in the 
Nordic Contract Acts are on the other hand default rules that parties can change by mutual 
agreement for example through an “entire-agreement” clause.  
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Legislation, even when it is not binding, promotes standardization and predictability.167 
Agreement rules in a jurisdiction prescribe when promises become binding agreements. 
Another set of rules is needed to prescribe what the content of a contract is. The lawmaker 
can enact two distinct classes of background rules, default rules that parties can contract 
around, or immutable rules.168 Immutable contract law rules override explicit contract terms. 
The function of default rules, in addition to guiding interpretation, is to fill in gaps in 
incomplete contracts. 
Immutable rules typically protect weaker parties within the contract, or are designed to 
protect parties outside the contract by internalizing externalities. According to Ian Ayeres 
and Robert Gertner, the academic community is in consensus over the normative bases for 
immutability, but can disagree on the threshold and contexts when parentalistic concerns or 
externalities justify immutable rules.169 Immutable rules sometimes primarily reflect societal 
interests, such as maintaining the value of the currency by forbidding index-clauses.170 
Default rules are applied to the contract only after examining the explicit contract terms, 
established practice between the parties and established trade practice, in this order.171 The 
content of the contract depends on the contract terms, the applicable rules and established 
practices as well as the type of contract in question.172 
The problem of marketing pressure does not only concern consumers but affects also 
business to business contracting. Consequently, the proposed Finnish general marketing 
liability rule (in 1990) was intended to cover these contracts as well. Individual consumer 
law seems to be slowly evolving into “customer law” and expanding into the realm of 
business contracts.173 Business contracting can be instrumental, for future economic profit, 
or immediately satisfactory, where the buyer consumes the goods and no future transactions 
with the goods are expected.174 Many small entrepreneurs’ resources and bargaining power 
and skills are comparable to consumers, and many legal entities, such as housing 
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associations, are habitually comprised of amateurs. Such parties are disadvantaged when 
they contract outside their regular activities or for their own essential non-profit usage.  
The extended concept of consumer in the Finnish ICA seems to reflected general trends in 
contract law to protect weaker parties that are not consumers in the traditional sense. Below, 
I will examine the theoretical questions outlined above by looking at how a default rule on 
marketing liability could promote both protection of the weaker party and economic 
efficiency.   
 
3.3.1 The economic purpose of contracting  
 
As the market based economy is almost universally accepted as the basis of the economic 
system, contract law should primarily serve economic purposes, as the parties’ behavior is 
mainly influenced by economic interests.175 This purpose became apparent already in the 
discussion of the significance of will and reliance in determining why contracts are binding. 
It was the question of why a promise that was not relied upon should ever be enforced. Such 
reliance could not be justified on purely corrective grounds, as the promisee had not lost 
anything. The answer, beyond distributive justice, was to be found in the need to facilitate 
economic efficiency.176 The possibility of resorting to the legal system if things go wrong, 
is not the focus of economic transactions, and only a tiny fraction of contracts are ever tested 
in court. The guiding principles of contract law can thus be assumed to be inherently 
economic.177  
In economics, the aim of exchange is the effective and value-adding allocation of 
resources,178 and law facilitates this by creating the necessary institutional framework, as 
well as through incentivizing and corrective legislation. Economists contend that 
redistributive ends should generally be kept outside of contract law, as the appropriate means 
for redistribution are through tax-and transfer. The economist sees efficiency that avoids 
wasting as the benchmark for private law.179  
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Pöyhönen sees that the role of the legislator is best understood as a provider of a public 
utility, the law of property that consists of three interlocking elements: ownership, contract 
and liability for damages.180 The law of ownership makes the exploitation of the economic 
values of goods possible. Liability for damages protects this exploitation from outside 
interference. The role of contract is, according to Pöyhönen, to let those parties that place a 
value on the goods agree on the details of how the goods are to be exploited.181 It is after all 
usually the maximum realization of human potential that tells us which endeavors are 
worthwhile and how to spend money well.182 
Melvin A. Eisenberg proposes that a better benchmark, for good contract law, is a perfect 
legislator that exercises good judgment by properly weighing moral, policy and empirical 
propositions. After this exercise, the legislator should subordinate different contract law 
rules to achieve “the best vector of propositions.”183 Ola Svensson proposes instead that it is 
the freedom of contract that enables people to realize their life goals. Svensson’s benchmark 
is a rational and informed person who, in addition to legal freedom, has the actual freedom 
to enter into contracts. According to Svensson actual freedom of contract includes sufficient 
means and a just background law.184  
The economic benchmarks of contract law can however be criticized on several grounds. 
According to Erik Lagerspetz, the purpose of contract law should not be derived uncritically 
from economics, as choice is not the same as preference, preferences are not necessarily 
egoistic, economic efficiency is not the same as cumulative benefit, and actors are not always 
rational individuals that maximize benefit.185 Also, according to Alan Aldridge, economic 
argumentation displays a recurring logical slippage. This is seen in how economists in the 
same argument, fluctuate between describing how actual markets perform (is), model the 
market analytically (as if) and prescribe what kind of policies would be needed for a 
functioning free market (ought).186  Finally, in advocating the satisfaction of individual 
preferences, economic efficiency fails to connect actual consent with subsequent events that 
change preferences. If hypothetical consent is benchmark for subsequent events, the 
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justification for the enforcement of actual consent is lost, and the resulting guidance for the 
court is vague, at best.187  
The implication here is that a general rule to regulate marketing, which critically respects 
the economic purpose of contract law, should strive for a balance between normative and 
economic arguments, and the benchmark good contract law, should reflect this balance. 
 
3.3.2 Mutually beneficial contracting  
 
Empirical studies have shown that people actually behave in a radically different way than 
what a traditional economist’s model of a perfectly selfish person would lead to assume. The 
classical homo economicus only follows norms out of fear of legal or social sanctions. Real 
people actually have strong other-regarding preferences. In experimental games, test 
situations can verifiably be constructed so that no selfish person would ever cooperate, 
because the payoff for selfish behavior is higher. In these experiments however unselfish 
altruistic or spiteful behavior is as common as selfish behavior.188 
In social dilemma games, people often benevolently cooperate even though the best strategy 
individually is defection. Conversely, people often vengefully harm others, even though the 
best strategy for a selfish individual would be cooperation. In ultimatum games, the set-up 
is that there is a proposer of a sum of money and a responder. If the responder accepts a 
proposal, both become better off, but if the proposal is rejected, neither party gets anything. 
A selfish responder would rationally accept any offer in order to at least get something. In 
practice, offers that are too low are routinely rejected. The responder thus incurs a personal 
cost to harm the greedy proposer. Proposers intrinsically know that responders can be 
spiteful, and thus offer more than in dictator game situations where a recipient has no say 
and just has to accept what a dictator gives. Dictators altruistically still give something, but 
less than in ultimatum games. Stout says that this knowledge of the other parties’ spitefulness 
creates second-order effects that forces even selfish proposers to be more altruistic.189 
Altruistic and spiteful behavior allows social organisms to benefit their kin and group 
members by reinforcing cooperation and punishing deviants. This kind of behavior 
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contributes to an individual’s survival and reproductive success, and thus reinforced by 
natural selection.190 Consequently, rules that are “significantly other regarding” have a 
tendency to be become established and directly accepted by the society. It is efficient to treat 
others as you want to be treated. Even though non-efficient norms such as use of the necktie 
sometimes last persistently, it is more likely that efficient norms persist.191 Cooperation and 
spitefulness are as prevalent as selfishness. These other-regarding traits and sanctions are 
economically effective, as norms are followed even though no-one would be watching or 
enforcing the norm. The role of the legal system in this aspect is to lower the cost of 
cooperation and spitefulness in order to punish those that are too selfish.  
The difference in the way economists and jurists see contract law indicates that any change 
in contract law risks being systemically assessed in different ways by the two sciences. Pekka 
Timonen suggests that in lawmaking, the sciences need to have a common perception or 
benchmark about the fundamentals of the society that is being regulated.192 This can be done 
by deriving the objectives of regulation from the values of a market-based society. For 
example, to achieve equality, people should have equal opportunities, buyers and sellers 
should have equal bargaining power and income equality should be limited.193  
The freedom of contract is a central tenet of the market economy, but I propose that it is a 
means to an end, not an end itself. In doctoral thesis “Beyond Offer and Acceptance. Contract 
Law as a Response to Contract Failures” philosopher Mikko Wennberg develops the 
argument that the purpose of contract law is to facilitate mutually beneficial contracting. 
Wennberg starts his analysis from the binding force of contracts and ends with a synthesis 
of the justifications and functions of contract law. State enforcement is needed to overcome 
the risk of defection that would otherwise preempt contracting. The state of nature is a classic 
example of prisoner’s dilemma scenario, where cooperation would be beneficial for both 
parties, but where the benefit of one party is greater if she chooses to defect and the other 
party chooses to cooperate. As both parties know this risk, both defect and the benefit is less 
than cooperation.194 
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When cooperation is beneficial, it must be beneficial for both parties, as otherwise parties 
would not seek out a contract or agree on the division of gains.195 The optimal cost level of 
negotiation is when the transaction costs (search, negotiation and safeguarding) are the same 
before and after the contract is entered into as well as lower than the marginal benefits of the 
contract. The level of potential gain determines how much of their resources the parties are 
willing to use in contracting.196 By reducing transaction costs, contract law increases this 
available amount of resources for contracting.  
 
3.3.3 Could the insurance rule make for better contracts?  
The precondition for the insurance rule to work as a general contract law rule is thus that the 
rule would facilitates mutually beneficial contracting. This assessment requires however 
more precise criteria or benchmarks. 
According to Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen the fiction of a perfect contract is the best 
way to connect law and economics, and they define such a contract as having zero transaction 
costs, which in turn is a sufficient prerequisite for rational parties to allocate entitlements 
efficiently.197 However, their definition is insufficient, as transaction costs are only one 
reason to why contracting fails. According to Wennberg, a perfect contract is both complete 
and efficient. This means that whatever happens, the contract stays efficient for both parties 
and both parties never want to rewrite the contract.198 When the purpose of contract law is 
to facilitate mutually beneficial contracting, a change in agreement rules can be assessed in 
relation to whether subsequent contracts are more complete and efficient. 
A failed contract lacks in completeness, which means that the contract does not perfectly 
and consistently provide for all possible contingencies.199 An inefficient contract can be 
complete, if the contract still reflects what one or both of the parties wanted, due to for 
example moral constraints, social norms or status quo bias200, but only a complete and 
efficient contract can be perfect. A perfect contract is a counterfactual and ideal tool, because 
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absolute perfection in all possible contingencies is not really possible but for a Herculean 
contract jurists. A perfect contract is nevertheless not a useless construction, because only 
an actual promise reveals preferences and justifies enforcement.201  
The traditional academic consensus has been that default rules should as precisely as possible 
reflect what the parties would have wanted.202 This hypothetical consent based method has 
been shown by Wennberg to be problematic in many situations, not only because it is much 
harder for the courts ex post to determine what the parties would have wanted that for the 
parties to specify this in advance: 
 “appeals to hypothetical consent are often either unjustified, or when they seem to be 
justified, they can be presented in welfarist terms, and the whole idea of hypothetical 
consent becomes pointless […] if the parties know that the court will ex post impose 
exactly those terms the parties would have agreed to ex ante, then the parties seem to have 
the incentive to maximize the extent to which they rely on the courts. The problem is that 
if the parties know that the court will impose those terms the parties would have wanted 
(assuming the court is capable of doing so) it provides incentives for the parties to leave 
out explicit terms from their contract.”203  
The insurance rule mandates an objective assessment of the impression made by marketing 
information, but it also allows also for subjective criteria, so it does not rely on a hypothetical 
consent. To understand how the rule can place “consent” where it traditionally does not 
belong (marketing and subjective understanding) this legislative technique requires 
distinguishing agreement rules from substantive background rules, which is done below.204  
 
3.3.4 Does the rule not undermine contractual agreement?   
 
A contract is a particular type of norm, as it is created by the parties instead of a legislator. 
The combination of the predominantly written form of contracts and the immediate binding 
legal effects of contracts have according to P.S. Atiyah produced a phenomenon of legal 
reification, that dominates the classical model of contract. In this model, a contractual 
relationship is treated as a concrete thing or object, instead of just an abstraction, and 
contracts are seen to have an objective existence before any performance. 205 
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Contracts are commonly defined as legally enforceable agreements. This definition reflects 
a similar conceptual merging of written form and legal effects. The reified contract is an all-
or-nothing issue; the contractual obligations derive from the consensus of the parties at the 
single moment of creation.206 The problem is that such reification is inherently inconsistent 
with prior expectations created by marketing information. The insurance rule is incompatible 
with this all-or-nothing concept of agreement, because under the current law, the original 
agreement may be set aside. Marketing information can become a legally enforceable part 
of the contract, even many years after the policy was concluded, and irrespective of whether 
the information actually influenced the applicant's decision to get the policy.  
It is difficult to encompass the binding contractual effects of marketing information in this 
all-or-nothing concept of contractual agreement without convoluted hypothetical 
assumptions.  If contract is the same as agreement, the result is that the insurer would have 
implicitly agreed to be bound by the impression the policyholder had received of the 
marketing information, even though the insurer had actually provided the policyholder with 
policy terms to the contrary. 
One way deconstructing the agreement from the contract is to look at wealth as a process 
that has a history and a future, and where there is a dynamic relationship between different 
parties and their rights.207 If contract formation is a gradual process, instead of a single point 
in time, precontractual information can more easily be connected with contractual 
agreement.208 The detachment of the parties’ consensus and contractual obligations is 
developed even further by Wennberg, who proposes that interpretation of the agreement is 
an insufficient way to determine the content of contracts.209 Wennberg’s thesis is that 
contractual agreement is not the contract itself. The contract is born of a voluntary 
agreement, “but what exactly counts as a contract is always dependant on the rules of the 
jurisdiction.”210 A multitude of norms within a jurisdiction are independent of the actual 
promise and constrain the enforcement and interpretation of the promise.211   
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According to Wennberg, agreement is an important justification for enforcement of a 
contract, but agreement is only a minimal condition.212 It is thus not necessary to trace all of 
the elements of an enforceable contract to the agreement itself. Consequently, courts have 
the power to interpret, construct and reconstruct contracts.213  
Contract interpretation is not interpretation of an agreement, but an interpretation of the 
parties’ legal relation.214 The court may interpret the express wording of the agreement, or 
fill in the gaps if the agreement was silent on an issue or ambiguous. In addition, a contractual 
agreement may deal with an issue in an unacceptable way. The unacceptability can according 
to Wennberg be due to a mistake or subsequent impossibility to fulfill the contract. 215  In 
Finnish insurance law, marketing information can cause the contractual agreement to be 
unacceptable. In these situations of unacceptability, courts can reconstruct the contract 
terms.216 
In conclusion, the conceptual deconstruction of a contract into agreement and jurisdiction 
explains the particular feature of the insurer’s marketing liability, that there is no requirement 
for the marketing information to be constructed as an offer or to have a commercial effect 
on the decision to buy the insurance.  
 
 
3.3.5 Is the insurance rule optimal?  
 
In this chapter I propose that the insurance rule is conceptually consistent with the purpose 
of contract law, and it is apt to facilitate mutually beneficial contracting, because it promotes 
more efficient and complete contracts in an optimal way. This can be argued by assessing 
the rule in relation to contract failure.  
As a starting point, in relation to mutually beneficial contracting, a contract has not failed 
just because one party breaches a contract, does not perform, or when the contract proves 
not to be beneficial for one party. Such events are a normal part of economic activity and 
often quite beneficial, as these events can free resources and weed out ineffective actors. To 
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expose contract failures, contracting needs to be examined over time and the pool of 
contracts and against its effects on norms and behavior. 
Concretely, the legislator sees contract failures when similar issues give rise to grievances 
and litigation. In the case of insurance contracts, for example, grievances can arise due to 
the fact that the policy is too complex for the client to understand, the salesperson has 
misrepresented the contents of the policy or the policyholder engaged in fraud.  
Wennberg has proposed that the appropriate default rule depends on the source of contract 
failure.217 The different ways that marketing information can cause insurance contracts to 
fail can be traced to bargaining costs, strategic behavior, limited rationality and adverse 
selection. 
In coming to an acceptable agreement, parties do not plan for every contingency. It is simply 
impractical and costly to plan for everything, as otherwise the bargaining costs for research, 
drafting, and legal fees would be prohibitive. Transaction costs for contracting include 
search and information costs, bargaining costs and policing and enforcement costs.218  
The default rules’ impact on bargaining costs should be formed in a way that bargaining 
costs for the majority would be reduced, while keeping the number of actual people that want 
to contract around the default rule as low as possible. A majority rule that reduces cost, that 
might disappoint parties in a small minority of cases, is better in this aspect than a minority 
rule that increases bargaining costs, for example one that lets courts consider in every 
particular case what the parties wanted. The best evidence of what the majority would want 
is usually existing contracts, especially if there is no well-established default rule.219  
Good marketing increases sales, and at the same time decreases the sellers overall bargaining 
costs, as much of the basic information about products can be transmitted on a massive scale 
to buyers, instead of individually during each sale. The contractual liability for information 
in marketing also lowers transaction costs for buyers, since if buyers can rely on that 
information, individual negotiations are shorter. The content of marketing information is 
also generally easy to prove. Instead, the effect of the marketing information on the buyer’s 
decision to buy is difficult to prove.  
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In Finnish insurance law the policyholder does not have to prove that the marketing 
information actually affected the decision to buy. Bargaining costs are most important in 
insurance, as the contracts are complex. Only the insurer has the expertise to calculate the 
likelihood and costs of different risks and create insurance products to reflect these 
calculations and profit requirements. Due to the mass character of insurance, the individual 
customers save in bargaining costs that otherwise would make the business impossible if 
each customer had to bargain the contract from scratch. As insurance contracts, in aggregate, 
are very frequent and long term contracts, the parties (pool of insured and companies) trust 
each other and strive for cheaper ways to manage their transactions.      
When there is a significant imbalance of information between the parties, default rules 
should discourage strategic behavior.220 This is done by penalizing the party that does not 
reveal pertinent information that it has or could cheaply acquire221. Strategic behavior might 
also be bilateral, so that parties decide to leave certain issues up to the courts to decide. This 
should be discouraged if it is extremely difficult or costly to adjudicate the issues afterwards. 
Sometimes imbalance of information is economically effective, and should not be altered by 
the law. For example, if in a negotiation, where one party knows that it would be ruined if 
the other party does not perform, a default rule that forces the exposed party to reveal its 
precarious situation would induce the other party to offer a contract that guarantees 
performance, but at the same time that party would extract a very high price from the exposed 
party, with lower joint benefits.222 In insurance practice, an example of strategically 
important information for insurers might be their practices concerning the prevention of 
fraud.  
Misleading marketing is often done by agents during individual negotiations. Consumer 
contracts are mostly standard form, so the agents do not have the authority to change terms. 
This calls for an extensive definition of marketing. In Finnish insurance law, insurance 
agents act on the behalf and at the risk of the insurer. The insurer is responsible for what its 
agents promise, even if no actual policy existed that matched the agent’s promises. 
According to the preparatory works of the Finnish ICA “Because the representatives of the 
insurer, such as part-time agents, are part of the insurer’s marketing system, the insurer is 
also responsible for these representatives, so that the information they provide is not 
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incomplete, incorrect or misleading.”223 The historical analysis will shot that conceptualizing 
a single marketing system of the insurer and its agents was important for the development 
of Finnish insurance law, as such a presupposition in itself implies legislative solutions that 
would regulate the insurer and its agents together and not separately. 
 
Human sciences have put into question the liberalist fiction that rational, informed people 
know what is best for them by showing how limited rationality undermines contracting in a 
systematic and quantifiable way. The most salient limitations are the imperfect capabilities 
of acquiring and processing information, unfounded optimism and systematic errors in 
decision making. Decision making errors can be seen in the tendency to base decisions on 
the data and scenarios that are most readily available to the mind from memory or 
imagination, the tendency to regard only a subset of data as covering the whole issue, the 
tendency to systematically give too little thought to future benefits and costs compared to 
the present state of affairs, and the tendency to underestimate or ignore risks.224 
The implication is that free will does not equate with true freedom in case of mistake, when 
a party is not free to act differently, that is to act rationally. A mistake, be it about an 
expression or motive, does not give rise to reasonable expectations, if the other party should 
have been aware of the mistake.225 The role for the legislator is to approximate a right amount 
of carefulness into contracting226, which is different from paternalistically prescribing what 
the content of the contract should be. Certain types of contract clauses such as liquidated 
damages or non-performance terms in preprinted standard terms can impose onerous costs 
for practically unavoidable events, when parties contract on an optimistic note about the 
future and concentrate on their intention to perform. On the other hand, in situations where 
proof of actual damage due to nonperformance is difficult to obtain, a certainty of damages 
may facilitate contracting. Marketing information can easily acerbate the limited rationality 
of buyers. It is a common adage that most applicants do not read insurance policy terms, so 
the marketing information is the primary source of information about the policy for most 
customers.  
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In contracts of a mass character, adverse selection can lead to the failure of all other similar 
contracts. Examples of mass character contracts are, in addition to insurance, corporate mass 
relations with stockholders, creditors, and employees.227 In a pool of insurance contracts, if 
some members are seen as unfairly subsidized to the detriment of other members, the 
collective incentive for the net-payers to defect from the pool can overcome the individual 
benefits of staying within the pool, and the pool eventually collapses because the remaining 
net-receivers cannot cover the costs. This happens for example if groups of high-risk and 
low-risk members have the same insurance premiums and policies.228    
Mass character contracts call for default rules that work against adverse selection. Private 
enforcement of claims is important to maintain trust with the pool. If one member of the pool 
is compensated for misleading marketing, other affected members should be compensated 
as well, in a relatively easy and cheap way, bearing in mind that the individual interest in 
consumer cases is usually small. Procedurally, class action lawsuits, or free alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms like consumer boards are the preferred instruments for small 
claims. Substantively, the burden of proof is of primary importance. If each consumer has to 
prove that the marketing information affected his or her business decision, the integrity of 
the pool is jeopardized. In Finnish insurance law, the objective evaluation of marketing 
information is a rule that maintains the entire pool. An example of this effect was seen in 
case KKO 2010:25 (Skandia Life), where misleading profit calculations in marketing 
materials for an investment-type pension insurance led to the entire affected pool to be 
compensated for excessive administrative costs.   
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4. The implications of the legislative history of the rule  
 
A feature of modern contract law is that the weight of legal sources has changed. The 
hierarchy of legal sources is not always the primary reference when courts justify their 
decisions. Instead, according to Pöyhönen, legal sources are chosen contingently for their 
information value on questions of morality or policy.229  
The traditional distinction between “subjective” historical knowledge of the legislator’s 
intention and “objective” legal knowledge has become problematic,230 as the historical 
method produces pertinent information on the motives of the legislator.231 In his research, 
Ewald emphasizes that law should be reconciled with its history and not be conceptualized 
in essentialist terms. He proposes that the law is a “qualifier of different historical practices” 
of rationality, normativity, policy, coercion and social sanction.232  
I propose that information about the actual motives behind the insurance rule could be 
relevant, should the rule would ever become part of general contract law. As the other 
attempts to craft a similar rule for contract law and consumer law failed, it should be possible 
to identify some tipping point in the legislative process behind the insurance rule that could 
explain why the reform succeeded.  
Häyhä has proposed that when the insurance contract law was reformed, while mostly 
concerned with practical problems, the lawmaker was guided on an abstract level by two, 
somewhat contradictory views on the purpose of legislation. The first view was that 
legislation is only possible for behavior that is sufficiently regular, so that law fits into a pre-
existing normative structure. The second view was that order is possible precisely because 
the law manages people's expectations.233  
Pöyhönen has noted that preparatory works have acquired an increased importance, not as 
authoritative sources of law, but as sources that explain the rationale of the law.234 However, 
the short passage in the preparatory works, that insurance agents are part of a marketing 
system, does not elaborate on why insurance agents are, in Finland, deemed to be part of the 
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insurer’s marketing system, when other countries see them as “distributors”. This discussion 
took place over five years before the preparatory works were published.  
In most legal research, unpublished documents are not seen as a source of law whereas 
preparatory works are recognized by the legal community and they constitute weakly 
binding grounds for judgment, i.e. a court may deviate from the preparatory works but must 
explain its reasons for doing so.235 This distinction is problematic, if the aim is to find 
epistemically objective truths about the rationale of a law. As evidence of the actual motives 
of the legislator, internal documents written at the time when the decisions were made are 
more reliable than recollections and documents drafted for wide public circulation. In the 
historical method, the more convincing documents are classified as primary sources, whereas 
the less convincing documents are secondary sources.  
 
4.1 1970’s: The reform process begins and the problem are identified  
 
The reform process of the Nordic Insurance Acts began at a time of decline in inter-Nordic 
legal cooperation. Bernitz notes that “eager politicians” complained about the unnecessarily 
protracted and cumbersome process, and “staked out each country’s right to lead the way, 
acting as groundbreaker and pioneer among the Nordic countries”, which lowered ambitions 
and paved the way for increasing national deviations.236 The inter-Nordic meetings 
nevertheless brought together highly qualified, learned jurists “in a spirit of confidentiality 
and cooperation, far away from the political conflicts of the day.”237  
For insurance contract law, in 1974, Sweden took on the role of pioneer, by announcing to 
the other Nordic countries that the ICA was in need of reform.238 Norway239, Denmark and 
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Finland in followed suit in the subsequent years and created their own reform committees.240 
The different committees operated nationally, although they met regularly to coordinate their 
activities.  
The national meetings, as well as joint Nordic meetings were in general organized so that 
general, thematic issues were discussed more extensively during the first meetings and when 
draft statutes had been drafted the discussions were organized under specific clauses.241 The 
reform process covered a wide range of issues, so the question of marketing liability was 
only one area of concern that developed gradually over the years.  
In 1977 when the Finnish reform committee started its work it was uncertain whether it had 
a mandate to regulate marketing. The committee members were divided over whether 
marketing should be understood in a narrow technical sense of advertisements, or in a wide 
sense as including home sales by part-time agents.242 In its first report, the committee 
nevertheless noted the problems that the lack of regulation of these issues caused to the 
policyholder. Firstly, when accidents did occur, the insurance cover was often not as wide 
as the consumer had believed. Secondly, the payments often did not amount to what the 
consumer had expected.243 The committee proposed examining whether consumer law and 
its rules on the administrative control of standard contract terms could be applied directly to 
insurance law, or if special legislation was needed.244     
In 1978, the Finnish committee concluded that, similar to what the Norwegian commission 
had proposed, special legislation to was indeed needed, to regulate situations where the 
“actions or negligence of the part-time agent caused loss [of a legal right] to the applicant”.245  
The pressing need to regulate insurance agents in Finland had to do with the particular 
characteristics of the national insurance market. While the role of agents as insurance 
distributors was at the time diminishing, due to increasing direct sales by the insurance 
companies, the number of agents still counted in the thousands which was according to the 
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committee much more than in other countries.246 The agents were usually specialized in 
specific types of insurances. The insurances were distributed by 1) agents that distributed 
life-insurance as a side-job, 2) agents that could distribute insurance due to their particular 
position as a bank manager or similar 3) agents that distributed insurance as part of customer 
service when selling other commodities such as cars or package 4) other institutional 
distributors such as shipbuilders or sports associations.247 Most of the agents that had 
insurance sales as a side-job were so called “hint-agents” that gave tips about clients to full-
time sales staff.248  
In general, all the agents had distributor contracts with the insurer that distinguished them 
from employed insurance salesmen. The agents did not have authority to bind the insurer or 
to change policy terms, nor did they collect premiums except for travel- and automobile 
insurance. The Finnish committee noted that the agents nevertheless acted as representatives 
of the insurer, and the clients were unclear of the extent of the agent’s authority.249  
 
4.2 1980-1984: The debate over an appropriate rule to regulate agents       
 
The decline in inter-Nordic Legal coordination was recognized in the ICA committees. Some 
Swedish committee members in particular found it hard to balance Nordic unity and national 
interests, and they questioned the practical needs for coordination, while others maintained 
that legal coordination had an intrinsic value in itself, as well as the value of facilitating 
Nordic labor mobility. Bertil Bengtsson noted in 1981 that legislative coordination was a 
general goal, but that the Swedish committee’s willingness to compromise depended on their 
wishes for particular solutions, as well as a case-by-case evaluation of the practical needs 
for coordination.250  
During the first years of the ICA reform process there was no consensus among the Nordic 
reform committees that insurance agents were indeed part of the “marketing system” of the 
insurer. In 1980, the Finnish committee noted that any private law sanctions against the 
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insurer would create opportunities for the policyholder to engage in speculation, 251 but that 
it would also create problems of interpretation, if information given to the policyholder, after 
the contract was concluded, would be more binding than information given beforehand.252 
As an alternative solution to the problem, an official registry of agents and a mandatory 
“agent’s card” that agents would need to show clients, was proposed.253 
Increased administrative control of contracting seemed to partly fulfill the need for private 
law sanctions.  This is what happened in Sweden in 1982, when an industry-wide agreement 
on the relationship between agents and insurers was achieved. The agreement would make 
administrative control of agents more effective by introducing a registry for agents and 
banning them from representing more than one insurer at a time.254 
The question of insurance agents returned to the Finnish agenda255 in the spring of 1983, 
after a hiatus of several years.256 As chair of the Finnish property insurance working group 
was appointed Jussi Järventaus, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Justice. Under his 
stewardship, the Finnish working group gradually adopted the extensive definition of agents 
as part of the insurers marketing system. The Finnish working group noted that the selling 
of insurances caused a substantial amount of misunderstandings, and in many disputes the 
policyholders were claiming that insurance agents had acted wrongfully. According to a 
memorandum by Järventaus, the marketing of insurance at the time was done to a substantial 
degree via the insurance agents,257 but on the other hand this marketing information had not 
had binding effects on the contract terms, in legal praxis. In a decision by the consumer 
dispute board, a policy had been found defective due to misleading marketing, but the only 
remedy had been that the insurer was reimbursed for the premiums that had been paid, 
instead of having the damage covered in full. 258  
To solve the problem of insurance agents, the working group re-examined in 1983 an earlier 
draft provision from 1980 on the authority of insurance agents. The provision bound the 
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insurer to the statements of the agents. According to the complex provision, if the agent 
“overstepped the authority given by the insurer and granted exceptions to the insurer's policy 
terms, or engaged in other juridical acts toward the applicant, these acts would bind the 
insurer.”259 The working group considered this draft superfluous, while recognizing that the 
uncertain question should be “normed” with a positive law regulation.260  
In early 1984 the Finnish ministry of Justice gave unequivocal instructions to the Finnish 
working group, to look into how it could be guaranteed that the applicant gets sufficient 
information, in order to evaluate his or her needs and choose an appropriate policy, “on the 
premise that the insurance company is liable for the insurance agents’ actions and 
negligence”.261   
The system of sanctions was discussed at the inter-Nordic meeting in Helsinki on 14-
15.5.1984. The Norwegians at the time proposed limited duties for the insurer to advise the 
client, sanctioned by a clause on the ineffectiveness of limitations clauses.262 This remedy 
was understood by the Nordic meeting to cover the applicant’s expectation interest.263 For 
his Nordic colleagues Bengtsson noted that the Swedes were “tempted” to add a clause on 
the insurer’s civil liability, but only for the most outrageous cases. However he warned that 
the determination of culpa would be very difficult, and added that any clause on damages 
should clearly state that damages can be awarded only in exceptional cases. Järventaus in 
                                                          
259 OM 2703/06/76 Attachment to committee protocol 2.4.1983: 3d, Vakuutusasiamiehen valtuutus  (the 
provision was apparently proposed in 1980 by Thomas Wilhelmsson who was secretary for the first 
committee, this is suggested by his name on the proposal text). The style is typical of the  older legal texts: 
“Jos vakuutusasiamies, ylittäen vakuutuksenantajan antaman valtuutuksen, solmii 
vakuutuksenottajan kanssa vakuutussopimuksen, myöntää tälle poikkeuksen vakuutuksenantajan 
soveltamista yleisistä vakuutusehdoista tai maksutaulukosta, antaa vakuutusta haettaessa […] 
menettelyohjeita, ottaa vastaan vakuutusmaksun taikka suorittaa muun oikeustoimen 
vakuutuksenottajaa tai vakuutettua kohtaan, on tämä oikeustoimi vakuutuksenantajaa sitova, jollei 
vakuutuksenottaja tai vakuutettu tiennyt tai hänen olisi pitänyt tietää, että vakuutusasiamies ylitti 
valtuutensa.” 
260 FI- “Epäselvä tilanne tulisi normeerata positiivisella säännöksellä” OM 43/41/84 Binder 3 Committee 
protocol 29.4.1983 
261 Extract from the list of decisions of the Finnish Ministry of Justice Jan. 1984. OM 43/41/84; The Finnish 
Insurance Contract Act reform committee had noted already in 1977 that the role of insurance agents in the 
insurer-insured relationship should be clarified. Kom 1977:70 p. 18,23   
262 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Bundle 7e Helsinki 14-15.5.1984 Skadeforsikringsloven, Draft text May 1984: 
§2-3 (selskapets plikt til å orientere forsikringstageren om dekningsmuligheter) 
Kan en begrensning av forsikringsdekning etter standardvilkårene unngås gjennom bruk av 
standardiserte spesialvilkår, skal selskapet gi forsikringstageren klar orientering om dette.[...] Har 
selkapet ikke gitt slik orientering, svarer det som om forsikringsavtalen var inngått uten vedkommende 
begrensning[...] 
263 Järventaus uses the term ”Positiva avtalsintresset” OM 43/41/84 Bundle 4 Binder 7e Helsinki 14–
15.5.1984 Förslag till diskussionsämnen p.2 
53 
 
turn insisted on a clause on civil liability to protect applicants from being misled, something 
he claimed administrative sanctions could not directly achieve. 264  
The reason for the Swedish reluctance is revealed in the tone of the internal protocols of the 
Swedish committee. After the abovementioned Nordic meeting, the Swedes were mainly 
concerned that it would “look bad” if their insurance contract act did not have a similar rule, 
now that Finland and Norway were proposing on private-law sanctions. The main Swedish 
reservation against such sanctions was a concern that these could be misunderstood by 
“querulous persons”. The committee therefore decided to stick with a “vague rule” that 
referred to general principles of liability for damages.265  
The debate over an appropriate rule to regulate agents shows that there were fundamental 
differences between the Nordic states in their presuppositions for insurance contract law. For 
the Finns, the practical need to regulate the authority of agents drove the evolution of a rule 
that also needed to encompass the binding effects of advertising. The chosen path was to 
adopt an extensive definition of marketing and to eventually steer contract formation itself.  
 
4.3 1985:  The Finnish rule is crafted    
 
Initially, the Finnish committee leaned towards a formulation, according to which the insurer 
could not call upon an essential provision about which the applicant had not been informed. 
However, in the spring of 1985, the Finnish working group reasoned itself to what would be 
the rule on the contractual liability for information in marketing. On the margins of the 
original rule proposal, there is a handwritten commentary, most likely by Järventaus, where 
he notes that this original rule can almost be understood as regulating contract formation. 
Järventaus listed two imperative needs that the original rule did not fulfill: The first need 
was that administrative sanctions were not enough to force the insurer to align its claims 
handling, organization, product development and marketing. The second need was that 
administrative sanctions were of little solace to policyholders that had been targeted by 
misleading marketing.  
 
                                                          
264 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Bundle 7e protocol Helsinki 14–15.5.1984 p.13; Förslag till diskussionsämnen p.2 
265 YK nr 3997 A1:1 Protocol nr. 59, 21.05.1984 
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The lawmaker’s requirements for a rule266 
 
 
In May 1985 the Järventaus formulated a new alternative rule to accommodate these needs, 
which stated that if the policy deviated from the applicant’s justified understanding of the 
pre-contractual information that the insurer was obliged to provide, “the insurance contract 
is considered to be in force to the effect understood by the policyholder.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
266 Files of the property insurance working group OM 43/41/84 Binder 3 Draft law text Bundle 3 23.2.1985 
MJ 
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The new rule267 
 
After the working group had decided on the rule, it needed to consult and convince its 
stakeholders, the insurance industry and the consumer protection authorities. The 
stakeholders were asked about both options, the original “insurer cannot rely on”-rule and 
the alternative “to the effect understood by the policyholder”-rule. The Finnish insurance 
industry, much like the other Swedish insurance committee, were concerned the rule would 
have serious adverse effects.268 The objections of Pohjola group, a major Finnish insurer, are 
indicative of the position of the industry: 
“The alternative text would turn the entire insurance product into a loose, 
uncontrollable entity. Any legal efforts to afterwards determine its content would be 
dominated by the opinions of policyholders that had been disappointed in their 
unfounded wishes. These opinions do not necessarily have any connection with the 
information the policyholder had when he took the policy. Without documentation, 
no-one can remember, after years have passed, what kind of discussions took place 
when the policy was made.269 
                                                          
267 OM 43/41/84 Binder 3 Draft legislation, Bundle 3, 3.5.1985 
268 OM 43/41/84 Binder 3 Vahinkovakuutustyöryhmän kokous 23.1.1985 p.3; OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 
Nordiska överläggningar angående skadeförsäkring Helsingfors 10–11.3.1986 p.9 
269 OM 43/41/84 Binder 3. Vahinkovakuutustyöryhmä asiantuntijakokous II 18.10.1985 Varatuomari Antti 
Palmunen (Pohjola-yhtiöt) muistio p.2 and Vahinkovakuutustyöryhmä asiantuntijakokous 16.10.1985 p.1  
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The key legal issue about the alternative rule, that the other Nordic committees and the 
Finnish industry objected to, was the question of proof. Järventaus emphasized time after 
time that policyholders would still need to prove their claims in court, and that eventual cases 
that did not rely on written evidence would be rare.270  
Despite the objections of the industry, the rule was incorporated into the subsequent Finnish 
proposal for a Casualty Insurance Act, in October 1985. The proposal noted that agents had 
a significant role in the marketing of insurance. According to the proposal, general contract 
law principles of defect, due to marketing information, had not influenced the decisions of 
insurance complaint board. Administrative sanctions did not guarantee that the applicant 
received all the information he or she needed, nor did they provide remedy for the “grave 
consequences” of an inadequate insurance coverage. Therefore, the information given by 
these agents would be judged on the same bases as any other information given in the 
marketing of insurance, with ensuing contractual effects.271  
The new rule would, as a remedy for defect, grant the policyholder a right to demand a 
corrected insurance and to get an eventual claim paid as had been promised by the agent.272 
For insurance companies, there would be a need to train or trim their sales organization. The 
rule was not seen to affect the supply of insurance products, as trimming would only affect 
the passive sales force, such as travel agents that also sell insurance.273  
 
4.4 1986: A final attempt to avoid Nordic divergence  
 
The case KKO 1986 II 84 had a major influence in the process that eventually saw the 
proposed rule becoming enacted law.  
“KKO 1986 II 84: The insurance agent A had, when negotiating with B for and 
insurance for a  market garden, given an impression of the content of the policy terms 
that clearly deviated from their wording [concerning technical faults]. The policy was 
made according to the written policy. As the insurer had not authorized A to deviate 
from the policy terms, and A had no such authority based on law or common practice, 
the insurer was not liable towards B on the basis of A’s statements.” 
 
                                                          
270 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Nordiska överläggningar angående skadeförsäkring Helsingfors 10–11.3.1986 p.9 
271 LAVO 16/1985 p.21-23 
272 ibid.  
273 ibid.  
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The ruling ran counter to several prior decisions by the Insurance Complaints Board that had 
ascribed the insurer a liability for the agent’s statements.274  When the case was discussed in 
inter-Nordic meetings, the other countries said that they could not envision a similar outcome 
in their jurisdictions with the same facts.275 For the Finnish working group, the ruling showed 
that without reform, “the agent was entitled to tell the applicant about the insurance, but the 
applicant was not entitled to believe the agent.276 At the time, it was of course not know that 
the same applicant with the same facts would win a new case on the grounds of vicarious 
liability (KKO 1990:20) after he sued for damages instead of payment according to the 
policy.277 
The Swedes, as already mentioned in chapter 2, decided on the “insurer cannot rely on”-
rule.278 In addition to the fear that insurers would be flooded with vexatious claims, the 
Swedish committee’s main objection to the Finnish rule was that in their view, an agent’s 
defective promises could be corrected by sending the policyholder the terms of the policy 
after acceptance. The reasoning was that it was common knowledge that any insurance cover 
is regulated in an insurance policy, whereby a client could not solely rely on an agent's vague 
statements concerning the suitability of the cover.279 The Swedes also reasoned that the sale 
of insurance was different from the sale of goods, and that advertisements were not the 
reason why insurance were bought and thus advertisements did not really influence the 
content of insurance contracts.280 Notably, the Swedish rule does not cover omissions by the 
insurer (situations when the insurer had not given any information).281  
In August 1986 Järventaus wrote a letter to the Swedish committee urging it to reconsider 
and to adopt the Finnish rule. Acceptance, not payment, was for Järventaus the crucial 
                                                          
274 Häyhä 1996 p.213, p.214 ref.97 
275 OM 43/41/84 Matti L. Aho memorandum of the Nordic meeting in Oslo 7-8.10.1986 
276 OM 43/41/84 Binder 3 Bundle 4 2.chapter Järventaus speech 27.10.1986.  
277 “KKO 1990:26: [A] had through his actions caused the property to be uninsured against the risk in 
question and that [B] was caused a loss amounting to the insurance money that was not awarded.  [A] and 
his employer, the insurer, were ordered to compensate for [B] for its loss.” 
278 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Bundle 7b Försäkrinsrättskommitteen 1986-02-13 Skadeförsäkringslag, utkast 7: 
2:2 § [...]Härvid skall tydliga upplysningar ges om villkor som väsentlig begränsar försäkringsbolagets 
ansvar i förhållande till vad en försäkringstagare vid sådan försäkring i allmänhet har att räkna 
med[...] 
2:6 § Försäkringsbolaget får inte åberopa att bolagets ansvar är begränsat på visst sätt, om detta 
avviker från vad en försäkringstagare har anledning att anta med hänsyn till bolagets 
informationsskyldighet enligt denna lag och de uppgifter bolaget lämnat om försäkringen. 
279 SOU 1986:56 s.498 
280 SOU 1977:84 p.126-127 
281 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Nordiska överläggningar angående skadeförsäkring Helsingfors 10–11.3.1986 p.9 
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moment for contract formation in Nordic law. If the Swedes did not change their minds, 
Järventaus warned that “even though the two committees pursued a common material law, 
the results would at the end diverge.”282  
Also the Norwegians rejected the Finnish rule, preferring to base their sanction on general 
rules on damages, instead of the Finnish “interpretative construction”. For the Norwegians, 
the biggest objection was that the rule would have been difficult to implement, when agents 
did not have the legal authority to bind the insurer.283  Norwegian had initially proposed a 
rule on the insurer’s liability for damages resulting from defective information, but this rule 
was not codified.284  
At the time, the Swedish committee also thought that a codification on damages for was 
impractical and the amount of damages difficult to quantify, and thus the issue was better 
left to general principles of law.285 In 2015, Bengtsson reflected on this decision: 
“These arguments are partly not convincing. I do indeed bear a certain responsibility for 
them, as I might have written them myself. But one can sometimes get wiser with 
age.”286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
282 OM 43/41/84 Letter from Jussi Järventaus to Hans Jacobson 19.8.1986 
283 OM 43/41/84 Binder 4 Referat fra Nordisk FAL-møte i Oslo 7 og 8 oktober 1986 s.7 
284 OM 43/41/84 Mappi 4: nippu 7d Tekstutkast november 1984 § 2-1 (informasjon i forbindelse med 
tegningen) and § 2-4 (ansvar for mangelfull informasjon) 
285 Bengtsson 2015 p. 213  
286 Bengtsson 2015 p. 213 Bengtsson still sees a rule on damages as especially problematic in relation to the 
duty to inform about major exclusions, as such a rule could result in unreasonable claims by policyholders 
about risks that could never have been covered by the insurance.    
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5. Conclusions   
 
In anonymous, mass-character contracting, it is has become evident that the ideal of rational 
decision-making does not correspond to reality. Nordic law has responded in many ways to 
the increasing pressure of marketing information. However, the private law response has 
been varied. When the contradiction between the marketing and the contract exceeds 
acceptable business practice, consumers have been protected in Nordic legal praxis, 
according to a trailer-principle. The principle marked a shift from the traditional reified 
model of contracts, and has gradually extended the binding effect of indefinite promises on 
the content of the contract beyond the sale of goods.  
The open legal question for marketing liability has been, whether the appropriate sanction 
should be administrative sanction, negative interest or a binding effect. The failed attempts 
at legislating a binding effect show that a general liability for all marketing statements that 
have a commercial effect would go too far in diluting the legal certainty that written contracts 
after all offer. This is because such a change, without further qualifications, would have 
significant unintended effects on (non-legal) norms as well as on efficient and careful 
contracting.  
The Finnish insurance rule shows that it is better to normalize marketing. Normalization in 
is seen in the way the categories of incomplete, misleading and incorrect marketing were 
written into private law, because this defined what is the new normal and at the same time 
exposed deviant marketing by insurers and agents alike. This technique altered the 
relationship between the Finnish insurer and the policyholders, as they accepted a new way 
of understanding normal marketing.  This kind of private enforcement, by the entire pool of 
insured, is a powerful and effective way to deal with marketing.   
Market rationality has long held economic benchmarks for contract law rules, but these 
standards are imperfect, as complete contracts are also consistent with social norms. The 
best content for contract law rules can be found by in balancing economic and social norms. 
Contract law should facilitate mutually beneficial contracting, by promoting as complete and 
efficient contracts as possible. The insurance rule could, due to its open terminology, also 
work well as a general default rule, as it addresses many sources of contract failure, such a 
transaction costs, limited rationality and strategic thinking, that the majority of parties would 
want to have regulated by default.  
60 
 
Procedural rules on proof are of great importance for any rule on marketing liability, to avoid 
adverse consequences for mass contracting. A buyer should prove his or her claim of a 
mistaken impression, if this impression is not objectively apparent. As only actual consent 
reveals actual preferences, the insurance rule thus allows for a subjective understanding. 
The content of the sanction should be determined by the unacceptable marketing information 
that triggers it. The insurance rule alters the content of a contract beyond the agreement of 
the parties by determining what the content of the contract actually is. The theoretical and 
historical examinations have shown that the dogma of contracts as legally enforceable 
agreements affects, in a negative way, the private law responses to marketing information. 
The historical rationale of the Finnish insurance rule can be found, in the 1970’ and 80’s, in 
the legislator’s pragmatic reaction to two issues that had arisen in Finnish insurance disputes, 
firstly that advertising had not had binding effects and secondly that the statements, the 
“sales pitch”, of insurance agents had not had binding effects. The wording of the rule 
originated primarily from the legislator’s determination to reign in opportunistic and 
unprofessional insurance agents. The rule was designed to force insurers to streamline their 
marketing, including the agents, with the other functions of the insurance business. Also, the 
aim was to provide affected policyholders access to private law remedies that trade 
regulation and administrative sanctions could not provide.  
From the legislative history of the insurance rule we can learn that much of the resistance 
against the rule was related to legal certainty. It was feared that the rule would be misused 
by fraudsters and that it would make the insurance product into an uncontrollable entity. The 
insurance industry and the other Nordic committees were concerned that if a codification 
was allowed, the burden of proof rules would in practice be against the insurer and in favor 
of opportunistic and dishonest policyholders.  While these fears have not materialized to any 
relevant degree, at the time they were decisive in the inter-Nordic legislative split that 
occurred, although the Finnish legislator went to great lengths to emphasize that a 
policyholder would still need to prove his or her claim of a wrong impression caused by 
marketing.  
This study has explored many tension points between the Finnish insurance rule and contract 
law. It has shown that the contradiction between consumer protection and liberalist values 
disappears on a higher level of abstraction, because private autonomy is essential to the 
normalizing techniques of the state. In everyday contracting, the rule levels the playing field 
between insurers and policyholders.  
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